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ARTICLES
Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual
Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious
Freedom
Richard F. Duncan"
I. INTRODUCTION
It has become almost a cliche to observe that contemporary
America is in the middle of a kulturkampf. We have divided into
camps and are locked in what James D. Hunter calls a "struggle to
define America" and its culture.' A chasm separates us over issues
like prayer in public schools, abortion, the National Endowment
for the Arts, sex education, and homosexuality.2
The culture war is a battle over symbols and social institutions
and, perhaps, rages most intensely when advocates of the sexual
revolution lock horns with the forces of orthodox Christianity.'
The conflict between sexual revolutionists and the Church ti'pically
is a philosophical and theological dispute.4 However, when legisla-
* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, College of
Law.
1 JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE To DEFINE AMERICA
(1991).
2 Professor Hunter describes the primary areas of conflict more generally:
The contemporary culture war rages on a variety of institutional fronts. But five
areas in which it rages most intensely are in the realms of the family, education,
the popular media, law, and electoral politics.
Id at 173.
3 See id. at 43-48, 173.
4 Richard John Neuhaus describes the debate within the Church over homosexuality
this way:
What is now being demanded is not personal acceptance but agreement that
Christian doctrine and morality are fundamentally in error. What is demanded is
the formal blessing of libidinal liberation from communal restraints.
Richard John Neuhaus, Homosexuality and the Churches, FIRST THINGS, May 1990, at 64, 70.
For a good example of radical homosexual theology, see REV. ROBERT WILLIAMS, JUST AS
I AM, : A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BEING OUT, PROUD, AND CHRISTIAN (1992). Two advocates
of gay rights, Marshall Kirk and Erastus Pill, have called for an attack on "the moral
authority of homophobic churches by portraying them as antiquated backwaters, badly
Duncan in Notre Dame Law Review (1994) 69(3). Copyright 1994, Notre Dame University. Used by permission.
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tion codifying the values of the sexual revolution is enacted in the
form of laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or practice, the dispute becomes a legal one. Should
government enact antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual behav-
ior? Should such laws then be enforced against religious institu-
tions and individuals who hold conflicting religious beliefs?
To give context and texture to this problem, consider some of
the conflicts that may arise when legislation prohibiting employ-
ment and housing discrimination on the basis of sexual preference
or practice is proposed or enacted.
CASE ONE
Holy Savior School is a small interdenominational Christian
elementary school. The school's charter states that it was founded
to provide students with an education from an orthodox Christian
perspective5 and to employ teachers and staff members to serve as
role models of the Christian life for students and others in the
community.
Bob Smith and Frank Jones are both employees of the school.
Smith teaches fifth and sixth grade social studies classes and Jones
serves as the school's janitor. When school officials learn that
Smith and Jones are living together in a homosexual relationship,
they decide to terminate their employment because Smith and
Jones "are unrepentant sinners whose influence is harmful to our
students and our community."
out of step with the times and with the latest findings of psychology." Marshall K. Kirk &
Erastus Pill, Waging Peace, CHRISTOPHER STREET, No. 95, at 33, 38.
5 I use the term "orthodox Christian" or something similar to describe people who
are often labeled "Fundamentalists" by law review writers and the popular media. I con-
sider this latter term, which conjures up images of ayatollahs and irrational fervor, offen-
sive and a not very subtle means of marginalizing a significant segment of mainstream
American society. For example, the popular media "regularly refer to the Rev. Don
Wildmon, of the anti-pornography American Family Association, as a 'fundamentalist,'
notwithstanding that he's an ordained minister in the mainline United Methodist
Church." Don Feder, Focusing On Media's Selective Sensitivity, CONSERVATIVE CHRONICLE,
June 17, 1992, at 31. The obvious purpose of this tactic is to make Rev. Wildmon out as
an extremist without having to demonstrate that his views on pornography are outside
the mainstream. Sadly, this attempt to use extreme language to marginalize ideological
opposition has even made its way into prestigious law reviews. See Note, Constitutional
Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1905 (1993) (referring to "right-
wing, fundamentalist Christian groups" who oppose special rights for homosexuals). In a
recent letter to The New York Times, Alexander Harper, a minister in the mainline United
Church of Christ, compared media use of the word "fundamentalist" to "ugly racial slurs"
which cast "no light but only heat." He went on to call for a moratorium on the use of
the word. N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 1993, § 4 (Magazine) at 10.
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CASE TWO
Mike Strong is the sole proprietor of Word Christian Books, a
small business which employs ten workers. Strong is a "born again"
Christian who has accepted Jesus as his Savior and the Lord of his
life. Strong believes that all of his activities are governed by Bibli-
cal principles and has dedicated every aspect of his life to the
glory of God. He considers his business a ministry and seeks to
use it as a witness to the community of Biblical business ethics.
Although Strong hires employees without regard to race, gender,
or religion, he seeks to hire only men and women of integrity and
good character.
Strong sincerely believes that homosexual behavior is sinful
and that he is commanded to "fear the Lord and shun evil."6
Therefore, when he learns that one of his employees, Mary Doe,
is involved in an ongoing lesbian relationship, he terminates her
employment with his business.
CASE THRE
Margaret McCabe is a seventy-five-year old woman who was
recently widowed and is supporting herself on Social Security and
a little income generated by a five-plex apartment building she
owns and manages. As a devout Roman Catholic, Mrs. McCabe be-
lieves that fornication and homosexual behavior are serious sins
and that it is sinful for her to facilitate others who wish to commit
these sins. She also wishes to maintain a "family atmosphere" for
her tenants. Therefore, although Mrs. McCabe is willing to rent to
married heterosexual couples and to single men or women, she is
unwilling to rent to unmarried homosexual or heterosexual cohab-
iting couples.'
Each of these hypotheticals presents a clash of inconsistent
lifestyles.' And each also presents a classic confrontation between
6 Proverbs 3:7. Strong interprets the Bible as teaching that homosexuality is an
abominable sin. For example, Strong interprets Leviticus 18:22 as providing a clear com-
mand: "Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman: that is detestable." See also
Leviticus 20:13; Romans 1:24-27; I Corinthians 6:9-10.
Notice that for purposes of Strong's claim to religious freedom, it does not make a
difference whether his interpretation of the Bible is the "correct" one or even a widely-
held one. All that matters is that Strong sincerely believes that homosexuality is detest-
able in the eyes of God. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829
(1989); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
7 This hypothetical is similar to the facts of a recent California case. See Donahue
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1991),
review granted. 825"P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671
(Cal. 1993). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 136-45 (1993).
8 For example, Mrs. McCabe's desire to live her life in accordance with her reli-
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big government and individual freedom.' As a matter of public
policy, should government legislate a particular view of sexual
morality"0 and impose it on religious institutions and individuals
who wish merely to be left alone to govern their ministries, busi-
nesses, and property in accordance with their most profound and
deeply held principles and beliefs? If this regulatory scheme is
enacted, are religious objectors entitled to a free exercise exemp-
tion?
The purpose of this Article is to discuss and analyze the im-
pact on religious freedom brought about by the expansion of
antidiscrimination laws to protect sexual practices occurring out-
side of marriage." The primary focus of this inquiry is to deter-
gious beliefs clashes with her would-be tenants' desire to cohabit on McCabe's property.
Under the proposed legislation, the tenants' sexual practices are protected activities and
Mrs. McCabe's religious lifestyle is declared unlawful.
9 There is an interesting role reversal on this issue. Progressive sexual revolutionists
are on the side of big government and the legislation of morality; religious traditionalists
line up with individual freedom and the right to be left alone.
10 Antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual practices are based on the moral claim
that a person's sexual orientation, like a person's race and sex . . . tells nothing
of value about his or her attitudes, characteristics, abilities or limitations. It is a
false measure of individual worth ....
Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 32 (D.C. 1987) (describing the
moral posture of the District of Columbia law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 4 (1992) (noting that "defenders of the antidiscrimina-
tion principle often treat that principle as though it were a self-evident truth that certain
grounds for decision should be banned for moral reasons"). Of course, many individuals
in our society disagree, and believe that it is both rational and appropriate to make
character distinctions at least in part based upon a person's sexual behavior. For exam-
ple, in the first hypothetical above, the religious school's officials obviously believe deeply
that distinctions in terms of "individual worth" can be made between persons committed
to sexual fulfillment within marriage and those engaged in sexual relations outside of
marriage. Under antidiscrimination laws, a particular view of sexual morality, the sexual
relativism of social liberals, is codified and imposed on everyone else. For a discussion of
whether homosexual inclinations and practices are "like" race or gender, see infra notes
30-65 and accompanying texL
11 Antidiscrimination laws may protect sexual practices either expressly or impliedly.
For example, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, whi[h p'ohibits employment,
housing, and educational discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation," defines the
term as "male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or
practice." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(28) (1993). Laws in other jurisdictions, although not
covering sexual practices expressly, may do so indirectly by barring discrimination on the
basis of marital status. For example, in Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992);
review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993), the court interpreted a law
prohibiting housing discrimination on account of marital status to protect unmarried
cohabiting couples. However, in State By Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Minn.
1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court construed a similar provision and concluded "[i]t is
[Vol. 69:3
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mine whether religious institutions and individuals, who choose to
make distinctions based upon their sincerely held religious beliefs
regarding sexual morality, are (or should be) entitled to a free
exercise exemption from these laws.
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAWS" AND PUBLIC POLICY
The homosexual rights movement has become "a political
force to be reckoned with" 2 in recent years and "gay rights" leg-
islation 3 seems to be on top of the homosexual agenda. Interest-
ingly, advocates of the homosexual cause seem more concerned
about the symbolic consequences of these laws than the practical
gains in terms of employment and housing opportunities. 4 One
proponent of homosexual rights, writing in a national homosexual
newsmagazine, clearly and forcefully stated that "cultural accep-
tability" is the real goal of the homosexual movement:
[P]romoting homosexuality is exactly what the gay movement is
all about. This doesn't mean promoting homosexuality in the
Anita Bryant sense of recruiting young children at playgrounds.
It means promoting homosexuality as an acceptable and viable
means of expression, on a par with and equal to heterosexuali-
ty. Achieving this cultural acceptability is why a gay movement
exists .... "
Viewed through this prism, gay rights legislation is the vehicle
for enlisting the state and its monopoly of force on one side of
the struggle for cultural legitimacy." When a legislature acts to
obvious that the legislature did not intend to extend ... protection ... to include
unmarried, cohabiting couples in housing cases." The Minnesota Court was influenced by
the fact that Minnesota's antifornication law had not been repealed. Id.
12 RIcHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 292 (1992). For a history of the develop-
ment of the homosexual rights movement in America, see JOHN D'EMIUO, SExUAL POLI-
TIcs, SExuAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSExUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1940-1970 (1983).
13 As used herein, the term "gay rights legislation" or "homosexual rights legislation"
refers to antidiscrimination laws which include sexual orientation and practices among the
protected categories.
14 A recent student Comment describes this approach to homosexual rights legisla-
tion as the "dignity view." Under this view, homosexual rights legislation is seen "as pri-
marily a legislative affirmation of the goodness of gay and lesbian people and their life-
style." Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil
Rights Bill, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 549, 610 (1991).
15 Randy ShUts, The Queering of America, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 2, 1991, at 33. See also
RANDY SHILTS. AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 32
(1987) (the gay political agenda is "essentially a battle for social legitimacy").
16 For example, a recent student Comment observed that "[t]he most significant
19941
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protect homosexual behavior under antidiscrimination laws, it ele-
vates homosexual practices to the status of protected activities
while at the same time branding many mainstream religious insti-
tutions and individuals as outlaws engaged in antisocial and im-
moral behavior. Symbolically, gay rights legislation declares homo-
sexual behavior good (i.e., protected) and religiously motivated
discrimination evil (i.e., prohibited). These are stakes worth fight-
ing for, 7 and this issue may be the one which forces the Su-
preme Court to rethink its unwise decision, in Employment Division
v. Smith,"5 to drastically reduce the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause.
Dennis Altman, in his book on the "homosexualization" of
America, makes an important point that is critical to understand-
ing the political dynamics of gay rights legislation: "The greatest
single victory of the gay movement over the past decade has been
to shift the debate from behavior to identity, thus forcing oppo-
nents into a position where they can be seen as attacking the civil
rights of homosexual citizens rather than attacking specific...
antisocial behavior."' 9 Thus, homosexual activists have attempted
to define themselves as a legitimate minority group "comparable
to other minorities and deserving of the same rights, legal and
civil."20
Essentially, the argument goes something like this: "Being a
homosexual is analogous to being a racial or ethnic minority.
Racial and ethnic minorities are protected by anti-discrimination
laws. Therefore, homosexuals should have the same civil rights as
racial and ethnic minorities."2' The problem with this logic, of
impact of the [Massachusetts homosexual rights] law.. . was its effect on public con-
sciousness: the role it would play in bringing about a change in cultural acceptance of
same-sex relations." Comment, supra note 14, at 610.
17 Dr. James Dobson, a nationally-known psychologist and defender of the institution
of the family, recently observed: "We are in a civil war of values and the prize to the
victor is the next generation--our children and grandchildren." HUNTER, supra note 1, at
64 (1991).
18 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Indeed, in the Court's most recent free exercise case, Jus-
tice Souter called for the Court to re-examine Smith should a proper case present the
issue. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
19 DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF
THE HOMOSEXUAL 9 (1982).
20 Id. at 2.
21 As Dennis Altman observes: "In a country where people identify themselves by
reference to ethnicity and religion, it is not surprising that homosexuals have increasingly
come to see themselves as another ethnic group and to claim recognition on the basis of
this analogy." Id. at viii.
[Vol. 69:3
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course, is the major premise. Are homosexual inclinations and
practices really analogous to being a member of a particular race
or ethnic group? Is discrimination against persons engaged in
morally controversial behavior the same as discrimination on the
basis of race or ethnicity? If so, then the argument has force. If
not, then the case for homosexual rights needs to be made apart
from the case for racial and ethnic civil rights.
A. Antidiscrimination Laws: General Rule or Exception
We live in a free society, and the general principle is one of
free choice. Under this view, entrepreneurs who must meet the
payroll and bear the risks of the market are free to manage their
businesses and properties without governmental interference. Simi-
larly, each individual, as the exclusive owner of his or her person
and labor, has a right to decide where to live and for whom to
work.2
2
The traditional rule in employment law mirrors these funda-
mental principles and establishes a baseline of free choice and
autonomy for both employer and employee. Employers are free to
hire or fire "at any time and for any reason," and employees are
equally free to accept employment or to quit as it may please
them.' Historically, the law of landlord and tenant was also gov-
erned by the principles of choice and autonomy--landlords and
tenants were free to enter into leases (or not) with whomever they
chose and on any basis they chose. 4
In the second half of the Twentieth Century, however, a con-
sensus developed in America against certain types of private dis-
crimination. This consensus held that discrimination on the basis
22 The idea of self-ownership is critical to Locke's theory of property: "[E]very man
has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself." JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, 1 27 (John Wiedhofft Gough ed.,
1966). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21-24.
23 See Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Empker Policies and Contract
Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 733 (1986). Of course, the parties are free to enter into an em-
ployment contract providing for job security, and even in the absence of an express
contract an employer may be bound by policies and practices contained in its employee
manuals or handbooks. See id. at 743-51. See also SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 66
(HARV. L. REV. ed., 1990). As Professor Larry Alexander recently observed, "in a just
society there will be an area of liberty in which private people are permitted to express
their preferences with respect to 'their intimate companions, their associates, their employ-
ees and employers .... " Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong.
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154 (1992).
24 See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 692 (1980).
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of race, religion or gender was wrong and therefore should be
prohibited. 5
It is important to recognize, however, that civil rights laws
codifying this principle are nothing more than exceptions to the
general rule of free choice. Although employers and landlords are
prohibited from taking race, gender and religion into account
when selecting employees or tenants, they remain free to make
choices on the basis of other, non-protected factors. For example,
it is permissible to discriminate in employment against members
of the Ku Klux Klan and similar hate groups, even if the prospec-
tive employees are otherwise well-qualified for the job," Land-
lords likewise are free to refuse to rent to Klansmen,
pomographers, and other persons of undesirable character, even
though these prospective tenants have the means to pay rent and
good references from previous landlords."
Therefore, when proponents of homosexual rights legislation
argue that they are seeking nothing more than the same civil
rights everyone else has, they are wrong for two reasons. First,
they already have the same rights everyone else has, i.e., the right
to be protected against discrimination on the basis of their race,
gender, religion, and other protected categories. Second, since the
general rule continues to be one of free choice in employment
and housing matters,28 homosexual behavior is merely one of
countless activities left unprotected by antidiscrimination laws. As
we have seen, even a person's political associations, such as his or
her membership in the Ku Klux Klan or other unpopular groups,
are not protected activities under typical employment discrimina-
tion and fair housing laws.' Since political expression and asso-
ciation, activities recognized as fundamental rights by the First
Amendment, typically are not protected against private discrimina-
25 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 1-4. Although the antidiscrimination princi-
ple did not originally cover discrimination on the basis of age or disability, the principle
has expanded to cover these forms of discrimination. IM at 2.
26 See id. at 5. For example, when a minority-owned business recently learned that
one of its computer operators was the Grand Dragon of the New York Ku Klux Klan,
the firm decided to terminate his employment. Apparently, no federal or New York law
protects employees from being discharged on the basis of their political associations. See
Donatella Lorch, Jewish Group Aims at the Klan; Its Weapon: The Answering Machin N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1992, at B5.
27 See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 24, at 692-715.
28 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
29 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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tion, the argument for "equal treatment" for homosexual behavior
would appear to cut the other way.
B. Is Homosexual Behavior the Same as Race and Ethnicity?
Although homosexual behavior is just one of many activities
that are not covered by employment discrimination and fair hous-
ing laws, proponents of homosexual rights argue that persons who
engage in same-gender sexual activity are similarly situated to
racial and ethnic groups protected by these laws and are therefore
equally deserving of protection."0 A student Comment describes
this view as follows:
This argument... begins by analogizing sexual orientation to
race, gender or religion. It goes beyond . .. by arguing that a
person's identity as gay or lesbian is as good (or morally neu-
tral) as the religious or racial categories with which people self-
identifys."
Is homosexuality analogous to race and ethnicity for purposes of
antidiscrimination law and policy? Why has our society chosen to
prohibit private discrimination on the basis of race?
Some argue that racial discrimination has been outlawed be-
cause race is an immutable, unchosen characteristic "determined
solely by the accident of birth."2 Seizing on this theme, some
proponents of gay rights argue that sexual orientation is not a
chosen lifestyle, but rather an immutable, biologically determined
trait.3 Perhaps.' But even accepting the dubious claim that sex-
30 See Comment, supra note 14, at 613.
31 Id.
32 Cf Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
33 Several recent studies have focused on differences in the basic structure of the
hypothalamus and the anterior commissure of the human brain. Other studies have in-
volved monozygotic (identical) or dizygotic (fraternal) twins. See, e.g., Laura S. Allen &
Roger A. Gorski, Sexual Orientation and the Size of the Anterior Commissure in the Human
Brain, 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, August 1992, at 7199-
7202; Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1993, at 47-65.
Psychologists such as Dr. Evelyn Hooker have argued it is a "mistake to hope that we will
be able to modify or change homosexuality." Born or Bred?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at
53. For a general discussion of biological and other theories advanced to explain the
origins of homosexuality, see WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & DIANE RAYMOND, LOOKING 'AT
GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE (1988).
34 Several researchers criticize the findings and conclusions of recent studies on the
biological origins of homosexuality as "inconclusive." See David L. Wheeler, Studies Linking
Homosexuality to Genes Draw Criticism From Researchers, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION, Feb. 5, 1992,, at A8. In fact, some researchers doubt whether these studies have
"any relevance to an issue as complex as human sexuality." They noted that "so little is
1994]
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ual orientation is both inherent and unchangeable, is this a reason
to designate homosexuals as members of a protected class under
civil rights laws? 5 How important a factor is immutability in the
formulation of civil rights policy?
Suppose, for example, that a drug were invented that would
enable human beings to change their race. In other words, blacks
could take a safe, inexpensive pill and become Caucasian. Would
anyone argue seriously that civil rights laws should not cover
blacks who declined the drug and thereby chose to remain
black?"6
I think not. And I don't believe the immutability of race is
the reason that racial discrimination is anathema in our society
and under our laws. As was so often true, Dr. Martin Luther King
had a seminal insight when he taught us that racial discrimination
is anathema because people should be judged by the content of
their character, not by the color of their skin. 7 Racial discrimina-
known about how the brains of higher animals work that to assign function or meaning
to slight discrepancies in anatomical features is a gross oversimplification." Natalie Angier,
Researchers Find a Second Anatomical Idiosyncrasy in Brains of Homosexual Men, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1992, at 7. E.L. Pattullo, who until his retirement in 1987 was director of the
Center for the Behavioral Sciences and associate chairman of the department of psycholo-
gy at Harvard University, distinguishes homosexuality from race as follows: "It is indubita-
ble, however, that skin color and gender are genetically determined, whereas it is certain
that-often, if not always-the postnatal environment influences sexual orientation." E.L.
Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENTARY, December 1992, at 23. Finally, at least two
federal circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990). Circuit Judge Brunetti's opinion,
in the former case, was particularly straightforward: "Homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as
race, gender, or alienage . . . ." 895 F.2d at 573.
35 As Dennis Prager has observed, whether "homosexuals choose homosexuality is
entirely unrelated to the question of whether society ought to regard it as an equally
valid way of life." Dennis Prager, Homosexuality, the Bible, and Us-a Jewish Perspective THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer 1993, at 73. Moreover, even if biology determines the inclina-
tion, as human beings capable of moral reasoning homosexuals remain free to choose
whether to act on the inclinations.
36 See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1303 (1985); Janz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548
(D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993)
("Discrimination on the basis of race would not become permissible merely because a
future scientific advance permits the change in skin pigmentation.") The hypothetical in
the text was suggested by my colleague, Prof. David Moshman. Although he generally
supports gay rights legislation, he is not persuaded by the immutability argument.
37 "I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a nation where they
will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, reprinted in, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSEN-
(Vol. 69:3
HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
tion is wrong not because race is immutable and inherent, but
rather because it is a morally neutral characteristic. Race tells us
nothing about a person's character.38
Sexual behavior and orientation, however, tell us much about
a person's character because they tell us what a person does (or
what he is inclined to do)." Sexual conduct and preferences are
TIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 219 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1991).
Dr. King delivered this historic address at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963. Id.
at 217. In other words, Dr. King's insight suggests that people should be judged on the
basis of what they do, and not on the basis of their race or color. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 154 (1980) (distinguishing laws which burden burglars from
those which disadvantage blacks).
38 See Woodward v. United States. 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990) (Homosexuality is unlike race, gender, and other suspect classes
under the Equal Protection Clause because "homosexuality is primarily behavioral in na-
ture" and the "conduct or behavior of the members of a recognized suspect or quasi-
suspect class has no relevance to the identification of those groups"); High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 909
F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). Although there may be some racists in our society who
would argue otherwise, I know of no serious scholar who contends that race is a morally
significant characteristic. See Alexander, supra note 23, at 159.
39 Gen. Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was criticized
recently by Rep. Patricia Schroeder for his support of the military's ban on homosexuals.
Rep. Schroeder complained that his views were similar to those once used against deseg-
regating the military. General Powell, who is black, informed Rep. Schroeder that he
needed "no reminders concerning the history of African-Americans" in the military and
went on to remind her of the difference between race and sexuality.
Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is per-
haps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the
two is a convenient but invalid argument.
Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., Guidance From Cen. Powell, WASH. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at G3. Some
commentators argue that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (as opposed to
sexual conduct) is "often founded on the simple-minded assumption that 'a homosexual'
is someone who engages in homosexual conduct. The overgeneralization in this assump-
tion should be plain to anyone who can understand the concept of celibacy." Kenneth L.
Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.
C. DAVIS L. REv. 677, 728 n.174 (1991). Although chastity among self-identified homosex-
uals apparently is, to say the least, atypical, I certainly agree that it should not be dis-
couraged. See John Cary Sims, Moving Toward Equal Treatment of Homosexuals. 23 PAC. L.J.
1543, 1568 (1992) ("While it is possible that a few individuals might choose [celibacy],
they would certainly not be large enough in number to justify analyzing the rights of
homosexuals as if celibacy were typical or even common7); ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S.
WEINBERG, HOMOSExUALIIES: A STUDY OF DivERsiY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 85 (1978)
("Almost one-half of the white homosexual males . . . and one-third of the black homo-
sexual males . . . said that they had had at least five hundred different sexual partners
during the course of their homosexual careers."). Certainly, the distinction between status
and behavior would be critical should a state act to criminalize homosexuality as a status
offense. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). However, homosexual rights laws
operate to protect (not punish) homosexuals as a class, so Robinson is inapplicable. More-
over, I have been unable to find any empirical evidence demonstrating that celibate ho-
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fraught with moral and religious significance." To be sure, not
mosexuals are often victimized by discrimination in employment or housing. As Professor
Sims has argued, homosexual rights laws are intended primarily to protect homosexuals
who are sexually active. Sims, supra, at 1568. In fact, the homosexual rights movement is
concerned primarily with protecting the interests of practicing homosexuals to be openly
gay. See id.; Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law In The Mid-Eighties Part I
10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 459, 515-16 (1985). See also supra notes 192-97 and accompanying
text.
40 In his concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), Chief
Justice Burger summarized what he referred to as "millennia of moral teaching" about
homosexuality:.
[Tihe proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots." Decisions of indi-
viduals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention
throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices
is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards. Homosexual
sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6; Code
Just. 9.9.31. See also D. BAILE, HOMOSEXUALTY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN
TRADITION 70-81 (1975). During the English Reformation when powers of the
ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's Courts, the first English stat-
ute criminalizing sodomy was passed. 25 Hen. VIII, ch. 6. Blackstone described
"the infamous crime against nature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than
rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,"
and "a crime not fit to be named." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215.
The common law of England, including its prohibition of sodomy, became the
received law of Georgia and the other Colonies . . . . To hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to
cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
Our society's three major religions-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-historically have
viewed homosexuality as immoral. See, e.g., The Jewish Torah (Leviticus 18:22, 20:13), the
New Testament (Romans 1:26-28, I Timothy 1:9-10, 1 Corinthians 6:9-10) and the Koran
(The Heights 7:80). See also BLUMENFELD & RAYMOND, supra note 33, at 152. Finally, the
natural law tradition, a "resilient pillar of Western thought," condemns homosexual prac-
tices such as anal intercourse as an unnatural perversion of reproductive and digestive
organs. See Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality, NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at
25. It is precisely this unnatural merging of the reproductive organ of one man with the
anus of another that is the primary means of transmission of AIDS in our society. See
Warren Winkelstein, Jr., et. al., Sexual Practices and Risk of Infection by the Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus: The San Francisco Men's Health Study, 257 JAMA 321 (1987). Dr.
Winkeistein's findings "support the inference that sexual transmission of HIV infection in
homosexual/bisexual men in San Francisco, during the current AIDS epidemic, has been
largely a function of the numbers of sexual contacts and the practice of receptive
anal/genital contact among them." Id. at 325. See also Lawrence A. Kingsley, et. al., Sexual
Transmission Efficiency of Hepatitis B Virus and Human Immunodefifncy Virus Among Homosex-
ual Men, 264 JAMA 230 (1990). Another scientific study of hon,)sexual men published in
a leading medical journal found that "oral-anal sex with multiile male partners carries an
extremely high risk of intestinal infection." Thomas C. Quinn, et. al., The Polymicrobial
Origin of Intestinal Infections In Homosexual Men, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED 576, 582 (1983).
David Richards' 1979 statement denying the immorality of homosexuality because "[t]here
is no convincing evidence that homosexuality is either harmful to the homosexual or
correlated with any form of mental or physical disease" seems completely inoperative in
the era of AIDS. David Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957, 989
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everyone agrees that homosexual behaviors and inclinations are
immoral." But the point is that, unlike race, sexuality is morally
controversial. When an employer or landlord makes a distinction
based upon a person's sexuality, he is making a judgment about
the content of that individual's character.
It is important to recognize that the argument against gay
rights legislation does not require proof that homosexuality is
immoral, harmful, or unnatural, as it might if one were defending
laws prohibiting sodomy or otherwise employing the state's mo-
nopoly of force to punish or discourage homosexuality. 2 Here
the shoe is on the other foot-proponents of gay rights legislation
,are seeking minority status for homosexuals and wish to use gov-
ernmental power to punish and discourage employers and land-
lords for making decisions about their own businesses and proper-
ties based upon sincerely held religious or moral beliefs concern-
ing homosexuality. The burden should be on the proponents of
the pro-gay agenda to establish that the beliefs of these employers
and landlords are unreasonable, and that homosexuality, like race
and ethnicity, is in fact morally neutral.
Gay rights advocates have not carried either part of this bur-
den. By their own admission, there is no consensus in our society
that homosexuality is morally acceptable.43 Moreover, the view
(1979).
41 For example, a 1992 Gallup Poll found that 57% of Americans deemed homo-
sexuality an unacceptable lifestyle, with 38% believing it to be acceptable. ARIZONA RE-
PUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1993, at A19. A major survey conducted by the Kinsey Institute in 1970
confirms that a majority of Americans believe that homosexual behavior is wrong. ALBERT
D. KiAssEN ET. AL, SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S.: AN EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE 26-27 (Hubert J. O'Gorman ed., 1989). One commen-
tator, a proponent of expansive legal protection for homosexuals, agrees that even a brief
survey of the caselaw and legal literature "will reveal an utter lack of consensus both with
respect to the morality of homosexuality and with respect to society's view of the morality
of homosexuality." Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes And Suspect Classifications: On Discriminat-
ing, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 960-61 (1991). See REv. ROBERT WIL-
LIAMS, supra. note 4. See also ROBIN SCROGGINS, THE NEW TESTAMENT AND HOMOSEXUALITY
(1983).
42 See Strasser, supra note 41, at 960. I believe this case could be made in support
of sodomy laws. -See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
However, since it is beyond the scope of this Article, I will not attempt to make the
argument here. Suffice it to say that I agree with Prof. Harry Jaffa's wise observation that
"[c]onfining sexual friendship to its proper sphere-between man and wife-is the very
core of that morality by which civilization is constituted." HARRY V. JAFFA, HOMOSEXUALr1y
AND THE NATURAL IAW 35 (1990).
43 See Strasser, supra note 41, at 960-61 (acknowledging "an utter lack of consensus
both with respect to the morality of homosexuality and with respect to society's view of
the morality of homosexuality"). According to a recent U.S. News & World Report poll,
1994]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
that it is not morally acceptable-one seemingly held by a majority
today44 and which has withstood the test of time-certainly is, at
the very least, both reasonable and supportable.45 At least so far,
the argument that homosexuality and race are analogous has
failed because race is a morally neutral characteristic and homo-
sexuality is morally controversial.
The primary purpose of our Nation's civil rights laws prohibit-
ing racial discrimination was to remedy the severe economic depri-
vation caused by pervasive discrimination against blacks and other
racial minorities. 46 Civil rights laws were enacted against a back-
ground of devastating and widespread discrimination that relegat-
ed blacks in particular to only the most menial occupations and
73% of respondents oppose same-sex marriages, 70% oppose allowing homosexuals to
adopt children, and 60% oppose "legal partnerships" for homosexual couples. Important-
ly, very high proportions of those who hold these views say they hold them "very strong-
ly." Joseph P. Shapiro et. al., Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July
5, 1993, at 47. Moreover, 52% oppose teaching about homosexual orientation in sex
education classes in public schools with the strongest opposition coming from those with
school age children. ld. at 46. Finally, although 65% say they support equal rights for
homosexuals, 50% oppose extending civil rights laws to cover homosexuals. ld. at 48.
44 See supra note 41.
45 See supra note 40. Those who argue that homosexual behavior is immoral stand
on the shoulders of giants such as Blackstone, Augustine, Martin Luther, and John Cal-
vin. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries *215; Augustine, Sermon on I Corinthians
6:9, 10, 11, 19, reprinted in, SELECTED SERMONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 19-20 (Q. Howe, Jr. ed.,
1966); MARTIN LUTHER, COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS 31 (. Theodore
Mueller trans., 1954); JOHN CALVIN, CALVIN'S COMMENTARIES: THE EPISTLES OF PAUL THE
APOSTLE TO THE ROMANS AND TO THE THESSALONIANS 34-37 (Ross MacKenzie trans.) (Da-
vid W. Torrance & Thomas F. Torrance eds., 1960). Many reputable modem scholars
also conclude that homosexuality is immoral. See, e.g., JAFFA, supra note 42; PATRICK
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); John Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties To
Oneselfi" Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 445-46 (1987). The former director
of the Center for the Behavioral Sciences and associate chairman of the department of
psychology at Harvard University, E.L. Pattullo, who admits to being ambivalent about the
role of homosexuals in society, nevertheless believes that there are good reasons to resist
legal and social acceptance of the gay lifestyle:
Hence to the extent that society has an interest both in reproducing itself
and in strengthening the institution of the family-and to the extent that par-
ents have an interest in reducing the risk that their children will become homo-
sexual-there is warrant for resisting the movement to abolish all societal distinc-
tions between homosexual and heterosexual.
Pattulo, supra note 34, at 23.
46 According to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the evidence
demonstrating this widespread employment discrimination was "overwhelming." H.R. REP.
NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 26 (1963) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 914] (addi-
tional views of Reps. McCulloch, Lindsay, Cahill, Shriver, MacGregor, Mathias, and
Bromwell). See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law Enforcement, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (1989).
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the least attractive housing opportunities. One commentator re-
cently described the pervasiveness and severity of racial discrimina-
tion in employment existing just prior to passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964:
Despite the expressed policies of the executive branch ...
employment in the federal government remained largely segre-
gated in the 1950s and the early 1960s, with sharply defined
jobs for whites and blacks. Segregation and discrimination also
continued with little change in the private sector and in most
state and local governments ....
Blacks were excluded from traditionally "white" jobs and
were limited to lower paying, less desirable jobs throughout the
South. While discriminatory practices of employers and unions
in other regions were frequently less explicit and less rigid,
custom, inertia, seniority and referral systems, union pressure,
and informal practices accomplished much the same result
throughout the rest of the country."
The economic devastation of blacks and other nonwhites resulting
from 'these discriminatory practices is objectively demonstrable. For
example, in 1960 nonwhite males earned only 59.9 percent of the
income of white males, and nonwhite females earned only 50.3
percent as much as white females."
Have gay rights proponents proven their case that homosexu-
als have been economically impoverished by discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations and are there-
fore in desperate need of the protection of antidiscrimination laws
in these areas? No. Not only have they failed to prove that homo-
sexuals have been impoverished by discrimination, but the data
47 Rose, supra note, 46, at 1125-26. The Supreme Court has recognized that severe
discrimination against blacks in particular was the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964). For example, the
Court noted that discrimination against blacks in public accommodations was so severe
that black travellers were "often unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call
upon friends to put them up overnight." Id. at 253.
48 H.R. REP. No. 914, at 28 table 3. See Rose, supra note 46, at 1127. Rep. "William
M. McCulloch and his Republican colleagues concluded that this data revealed "the eco-
nomic straitjacket in which the Negro has been confined." H.1L REP. No. 914, at 28.
Admittedly, these statistics do not prove that the disparity in income was caused solely by
discrimination. But when coupled with the overwhelming evidence of pervasive discrimina-
tion discussed above, the argument that much of the income disparity between whites
and nonwhites was caused by employment discrimination is very persuasive and certainly
sufficient to support civil rights legislation.
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support the opposite conclusion-homosexuals are an economical-
ly advantaged group in our society.
According to Jeffrey J. Vitale, president of a marketing and
consulting firm that specializes in market research on homosexu-
als, "[a]ffluence is the rule for gay households."49 Another mar-
keting expert, Michael Kaminer, calls homosexuals "the market of
the decade.""
According to the 1990 U.S. Census, male homosexual house-
holds ranked at the top in terms of average annual household
income. The average household income for male homosexual
couples ($56,863) significantly exceeds that for married hetero-
sexual households ($47,012).52 Market surveys support these find-
ings. For example, a 1991 study conducted by Overlooked Opin-
ions, a marketing and consulting firm that specializes in the ho-
mosexual market, reported the following findings:53
Gay Men Lesbians Nat'l Average
Average
Household $51,325 $45,927 $36,520
Income
49 The quotation in the text comes from a letter Mr. Vitale recently published.
AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, September 1991, at 54. One national newspaper examined data
from the 1990 Census and concluded: "Gay male couples have higher incomes than any
other group, including married couples, traditionally the nation's most affluent family
type." Margaret L. Usdansky, Gay Couples By the Numbers: Data Suggest They're Fewer Than
Believed, But Affluent, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 12, 1993, at 8A.
50 Jane Applegate, From Videos to Greeting Cards, Gay Clout Abounds, WASH. POST. May
3, 1993, at F10. Mr. Kaminer noted that since many homosexual households have two in-
comes and no children, disposable income "dramatically increases." Id.
51 Usdansky, supra note 49, at 8A.
52 Id.
53 Ramon G. McLeod, Gay Market A Potential Gold Mine, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
Aug. 27, 1991, at Al. A 1992 survey of people who voted in the presidential election
contradicts this disparity between gay and straight household income. However, the gay
respondents were much younger, on average, than others in this survey and this "could
have driven down education and'income figures." In any event, even this study confirms
that homosexuals are not an economically impoverished class. Fifty-six percent of gay
men and 47% of lesbians reported annual family income in excess of $30,000. Anne
Cronin, Two Viewfinders, Two Pictures of Gay America, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 4, at 16.
As one supporter of gay rights observed after acknowledging evidence of gay affluence,
"to call homosexuals an impoverished class would be silly." Jonathan Rauch, Beyond Op-
pression, NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 20. See also Sullivan, supra note 40, at 34 ("Un-
like blacks three decades ago, gay men and lesbians suffer no discernible communal
economic deprivation and already operate at the highest levels of society . . ").
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The same study revealed that fifteen percent of male homosexual
households have incomes exceeding $100,000 (compared to only
four percent of all households), and that homosexuals are more
likely to have a college degree and a professional or managerial
career than heterosexuals.54
None of this is meant to imply that discrimination against
homosexuals does not occur in our society. It clearly does. Howev-
er, the available evidence indicates that it is neither pervasive55
nor economically devastating.
Not only are homosexuals an affluent and a highly educated
class, they are also. politically powerful. Homosexuals are far more
likely than average to vote,56 and one of the fastest-growing politi-
cal action organizations in Washington is the Human Rights Cam-
54 McLeod, supra note 53, at Al. Approximately 60% of adult homosexuals have
college degrees, compared to only about 20% of the overall population. More than 40%
of homosexuals have professional or managerial jobs, compared to about 30% of the
overall population. Id. The average years of education for homosexuals is 15.7, compared
to a national average of only 12.7. Rauch, supra note 53, at 20.
55 As California Governor Pete Wilson said when explaining his decision to veto a
1991 gay rights bill, the test of fairness for homosexual rights laws is "whether there is
evidence of discrimination so pervasive as to warrant state government imposing so widely
a burden so oppressive to potentially numerous innocent employers." Veto message of
Governor Pete Wilson concerning ASSEMBLY BILL 101, CAL. ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, Oct 17,
1991, at 4872. See Sims, supra note 39, at 1547 n.11.. Proponents of homosexual rights
laws have not met this burden. According to a recent large scale survey of gays and
lesbians,- only 15% reported they had experienced job discrimination. Martha Groves,
Frequent Job Bias'Leaves Little Recourse, Gays Say, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at Al.
See also SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 65 (17% of gay men "re-
port having lost or having been denied employment because they were gay"); Gregory M.
Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 133, 166 (1991) (16% of homosexuals responding to a national telephone
survey reported employment discrimination and 15% reported housing discrimination).
Notice that all of those numbers should be discounted somewhat, because they refer only
to reports of perceived discrimination as opposed to proven cases of discrimination. See
'also Lorena Dumas, Comment, The Sexual Orientation Clause of the District of Columbia's
Human Rights Ac 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 267, 274 (1991) (only three cases alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation were adjudicated by the D.C. Human Rights
Commission since 1973). In comparison, a 1984 survey found that 10% of white males
reported they had lost a promotion because of affirmative action preferences. Peter
Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, When Quotas Replace Merit, Everybody Suffers, FORBES, Feb. 15,
1993, at 82. Although Professor Rivera asserts that it is "generally acknowledged that
discrimination against homosexual persons is quite common," she neither explains what
"quite common" means nor cites any empirical evidence supporting her assertion.
Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons In The
United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 805-06 (1979).
56 According to a recent broadly based demographic survey of homosexuals, more
than 80% of gays and lesbians voted in the 1988 presidential election, compared to less'
than 60% of all citizens. McLeod, supra note 53, at Al.
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paign, a pro-gay group that raised $4.5 million in 1992.' During
the Democratic primaries in the last election, all five of the lead-
ing Democratic candidates for president "actively courted the gay
vote.""8 And, of course, President Clinton is a strong supporter of
the gay political agenda.5 9 As one commentator has observed, "it
is clear that homosexuals have crossed a threshold [and have
become] an integral part of American political life." '°
The other protected categories under typical
antidiscrimination laws-gender, religion, and disability-also are
unlike sexual orientation and behavior. Like racial minorities and
in contrast to homosexuals, women have a proven history of eco-
nomic disadvantage.61 People with disabilities likewise have a prov-
en and compelling need for governmental assistance in employ-
ment and housing.62 Also, like race and unlike sexual orientation
and behavior, both gender and disability are morally neutral char-
57 Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 20.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 21. See also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that "homo-
sexuals are not without political power"); POSNER, supra note 12, at 292 (homosexuals
"have become a political force to be reckoned with"). The political power of homosexu-
als is not surprising, because small, special interest groups "are exactly the groups that
are likely to obtain disproportionately large benefits from the political process." Geoffrey
P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397, 428.
61
There is a significant wage disparity between the earnings of women as a group
and the earnings of men as a group. The average working women [sic] earns
about 60 percent of what the average working man earns. The disparity displays
a stubborn persistency over time and within age groups ....
In 1981, a working woman earned 59.2 percent of what a working man
earned. The median income of women who worked full time in year-round jobs
was $12,001. The median income of men who worked full time in year-round
jobs was $20,260. As one would expect, women were overrepresented among
workers whose earnings were low and underrepresented among workers whose
earnings were high. Sixty-four percent of all workers who earned $7,000 to
$10,000 were women, while only 3 percent of all workers who earned over
$75,000 were women.
STEVEN L. WILLBORN, A COMPARABLE WORTH PRIMER 7 (1986). Professor Willborn pro-
vides numerous additional data supporting his conclusion that "the earnings disparity
between men and women has remained relatively constant for at least the last thirty
years." Id.
62 For example, in 1990 Congress reported that "[i]ndividuals with disabilities experi-
ence staggering levels of unemployment and poverty." H.JL REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990). The report, which accompanied the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act of 1990, fully documented this conclusion. Id. at 28-50.
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acterstics.' Finally, prohibition of religious discrimination is justi-
fied because unlike homosexual behavior, religious freedom is a
ffindamental constitutional right,' and from the beginning of the
American Republic religion has been viewed as "being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind.""5
It seems clear that homosexuals are not impoverished and
disempowered as were racial minorities in the early 1960s. Nor are
they similar to other classes protected by civil rights laws. There-
fore, the argument that they are analogous to racial minorities
and other protected groups for purposes of civil rights legislation
is unpersuasive. If antidiscrimination laws are to be amended to
include sexual orientation as a protected category, it must be
because homosexuality is deserving of protected status in its own
right, not derivatively through the experiences of other, dissimilar
groups.
C. The (Not So) Hidden Agenda: Gay Rights and Social Legitimacy
Antidiscrimination laws impose heavy costs on markets, indi-
viduals and society.' Although the economic costs of civil rights
laws are substantial,' so too are the costs in terms of political
63 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
64 Of course, religious freedom is expressly protected by the Bill of Rights. U.S.
CONST. amend. 1. In contrast, the Supreme Court clearly has held that there is no consti-
tutional right under the Due Process Clause to engage in homosexual sodomy. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1985). The Supreme Court has never recognized homosexuals as
a suspect or quasi-suspect class protected by strict or intermediate scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Strasser, supra note 41, at 937. Although it seems unlikely
that Bowers would have been decided differently under the Equal Protection Clause (id. at
949), as Professor Sunstein has observed, nothing in Bowers expressly forecloses an equal
protection claim by homosexuals harmed by governmental discrimination. Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi L. REv. 1161, 1168 (1988).
65 The language quoted in the text was adopted by the First Congress in 1789 when
it reenacted the Northwest Ordinance. 1 Stat. 50, 52. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2151 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("those who
adopted our Constitution ... believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a
public good"). In contrast, "millennia of moral teaching" throughout the course of West-
em civilization has condemned homosexual behavior as immoral and unacceptable. Bow-
ers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
66 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 10.
67 Two commentators recently estimated the costs of civil rights laws at 4% of GNP
(or more than $225 billion). Brimelow & Spencer, supra note 55, at 81-99. Prof. Epstein's
extensive research on modem employment discrimination laws led him to conclude that
they produce "a dangerous form of government coercion that in the end threatens
to . . . strangle the operation of labor and employment markets." EPSTEIN, supra note 10,
at 505.
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liberty* and intellectual freedom.' However, regarding race, reli-
gion, and gender, our society has developed a consensus that
these costs "should be cheerfully bome because they are more
than offset by the substantial social and symbolic gains to the
larger society.'16 Our society has not reached a similar consensus
about the cost-benefit ratio of extending antidiscrimination laws to
protect sexual inclinations and behavior.
We have already seen that homosexuality is not analogous to
race and gender for purposes of civil rights policy, because homo-
sexuality remains morally controversial and homosexuals are not
an economically disadvantaged class.7" What, then, is the goal of
proponents of homosexual rights legislation? If not economic
equality, exactly what end is being pursued by gay activists?
As gay journalist and activist Randy Shilts observed recently,
the gay political agenda is "essentially a battle for social legitima-
cy."71 Frank Kameny, an early leader of the homosexual rights
68 See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 500-05. Professor Epstein believes that "modern civil
rights laws are a new form of imperialism that threatens the political liberty and intellec-
tual freedom of us all." Id. at 505. Consider also Epstein's attempt to explain this conclu-
sion:
The antidiscrimination laws thus play havoc with the use of any standard insur-
ance principles, whether they deal with longevity or health, or any other aspect
of human behavior. In a similar vein the antidiscrimination laws lead to a sys-
tematic Orwellian campaign of disinformation. One is not allowed to ask about
age, about prior disability or handicap, about marital status, about individual
abilities. Tests that have modest predictive value are rejected in favor of univer-
sal generalizations that have no predictive value at all. And this systematic cam-
paign to discredit accurate statistical generalizations is punctuated by the self-
congratulatory pronouncement that we have done all this not for our benefit
but for yours. The current legislative view is that perfect information may be
used (precisely because it can never be acquired), but nothing less will do.
Id. at 503-04. Andrew Sullivan, a well-known journalist who supports an expansive gay
rights agenda, acknowledges that antidiscrimination laws protecting homosexuals infringe
upon the autonomy and liberty of employers and landlords covered by the legislation.
Sullivan, supra note 40, at 35-36.
69 EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 497.
70 See supra notes 30-65 and accompanying text.
71 SHILTS, supra note 15, at 32. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. Profes-
sor Marc Fajer, in his thought-provoking article on storytelling and gay rights, complains
that society's non-recognition of homosexual marriages "denies gay relationships public
legitimacy." Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Stoiytelling
, 
Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 577
(1992). Professor Fajer believes the law should recognize the right of homosexuals "to
carry on our lives in public." Id. at 605. By way of example, he is critical of a Roman
Catholic parish that recently expelled a priest who admitted "that he was gay and had
AIDS." Id at 573.
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movement, made the point forcefully in a 1964 speech.to the New
York Mattachine Society:
I take the stand that not only is homosexuality... not immor-
al, but that homosexual acts engaged in by consenting adults
are moral, in a positive and real sense, and are right, good,
and desirable, both for the individual participants and for the
society in which they live. 2
According to Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen, authors of a
widely read book that bills itself as a "gay manifesto for the
1990's," the gay political agenda involves a large scale campaign
designed to gain social acceptance for the homosexual lifestyle. In
what has become the principal textbook for homosexual activism,
Kirk and Madsen frankly admit that the strategy they recommend
amounts to a very sophisticated "propaganda" campaign. designed
to "transform society's antigay attitudes"73 and to vilify and even
silence those who oppose their agenda.'
Since homosexuals have already achieved economic equality
with the general population, the primary purpose served by ex-
tending antidiscrimination laws to protect sexual inclinations and
behavior is symbolic. When government passes homosexual rights
legislation it sends a message to society that the homosexual life-
style is legitimate, perhaps on a par with marriage and family life,
and that the government is so committed to this value that it will
bring force to bear against those who wish to manage their busi-
72 Frank Kameny, Speech to the New York Matrachine Society (uly 1964), in
D'EMILo, supra note 12, at 153. As Dennis Prager has observed, to advocate homosexual-
ity as a legitimate lifestyle, equal to marital relationships, constitutes an "assault on the
extremely hard-won, millenia-old battle for a fiamily-based, sexually monogamous society."
Prager, supra note 35, at 72.
73 MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AMrER THE BAWL How AMERICA WILL CON-
QUER ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE '90S 161 (1989). See also id at 162-63, 172-
73. The authors state that "antigay discrimination begins, like war, in the minds of men,
and must be stopped there with the help of propaganda." Id. at 163.
74 Id. at 189:
The objective is to make homohating beliefs and actions look so nasty that av-
erage Americans will want to dissociate themselves from them . . . . We also in-
tend, by this tactic, to make the very expression of homohatred so discreditable
that even Intransigents will eventually be silenced in public ....
This objective is to be accomplished by packaging homosexuals as victims of prejudice
while portraying those who disagree with their agenda as fanatics. For example, Kirk and
Madsen suggest that their opponents could be shown as "[k]lansmen demanding that
gays be slaughtered or castrated" or as "[h]ysterical backwoods preachers, drooling with
hate to a degree that looks both comical and deranged." Id. The goal is to marginalize,
discredit, and ultimately silence opposition. I
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nesses in accordance with a different code of ethics. Persons who
believe the homosexual lifestyle is sinful, immoral, or destructive
of traditional family values are given a Hobson's choice under
homosexual rights laws-either reject these deep personal beliefs
as a code of business ethics, or get out of business.75
Viewed from this perspective, homosexual rights legislation
constitutes one prong of a large scale campaign designed to trans-
form the way society views homosexuality. 6 Other prongs in this
sophisticated campaign include manipulation of the media7  and
of public school curricula7 8 to promote a positive view of the ho-
75 As Kenneth Karst has stated in a different context, living one's life in accordance
with one's profoundly held beliefs about religion and personal holiness has "a great deal
to do with the formation and shaping of an individual's sense of his own identity." Ken-
neth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635 (1980). Moreover,
a person's religious self-definition is important not only in terms of "what it says to him
but also by what it says (or what he thinks it says) to others." Id. at 636. Homosexual
rights laws thus employ the power of the state to restrict the religious self-definition and
expression of employers and landlords in order to facilitate the homosexuality and bisex-
uality of others.
76 KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 73, at 161-91. Many proponents of gay rights laws,
including a law professor who is drafting proposed federal legislation, argue "that laws
are often the first step toward changing hearts and minds." Shapiro et al., supra note 43,
at 48.
77 Kirk and Madsen have devised a sophisticated media campaign for achieving the
homosexual agenda. KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 73, at 173. They state that the "most
effective propaganda" tactics include gaining "access to the kinds of public media that
would automatically confer legitimacy upon these messages and, therefore, upon their gay
sponsors. To be accepted by the most prestigious media, such as network TV, our mes-
sages themselves will have to be-at least initially-both subtle in purpose and crafty in
construction." Id. at 173.
78 Consider, for example, the multicultural curriculum developed for use in public
schools in New York City. The teacher's manual for first grade exhorts teachers to foster
'positive attitudes toward sexuality" and explains what this means regarding homosexuali-
ty:
Teachers of first graders have an opportunity to give children a healthy sense of
identity at an early age. Classes should include references to lesbians/gay people
in all curricular areas and should avoid exclusionary practices by presuming a
person's sexual orientation, reinforcing stereotypes, or speaking of lesbians/gays
as "they" or "other."
If teachers do not discuss lesbian/gay issues, they are not likely to come
up. Children need actual experiences via creative play, books, visitors, etc. in or-
der for them to view lesbians/gays as real people to be respected and appreci-
ated. Educators have the potential to help increase the tolerance and acceptance
of the lesbian/gay community . . . .
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CHILDREN OF THE RAINBOW: FIRST
GRADE 372 (1991). Similar schemes of indoctrination also exist in higher education. For
example, the Social Work Department at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota issued a
policy statement that warned prospective students that "[iut is simply not acceptable for
social workers to view homosexual people as perverse or as sinners . .. .It is not OK in
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mosexual lifestyle and a negative view of "homophobia" and "reli-
gious intolerance."
Of course, proponents of the homosexual agenda have every
right to wage a propaganda campaign to promote social accep-
tance of the gay lifestyle and even to vilify traditional religion.
However, policy makers should be aware of this campaign and
should recognize that they stand at a crossroads when they consid-
er extending antidiscrimination laws to human sexuality. They
need to understand that the issue is not similar to race and gen-
der, nor is it about eliminating economic disparity and -injustice.
We all are sinners. But we all do not demand that our sins be
recognized as civil rights. The issue our society faces is one of
bedrock principle-we must choose between inconsistent value
systems, between the values of moral relativism and the sexual
revolution on the one hand, and the traditional values of family
and religious freedom on the other. And in making this decision
we must never forget the -high stakes involved. Although the issue
may be primarily a symbolic one, it is nevertheless symbolism of
crucial importance. As Professor James Hunter has observed, the
path we take at this crossroads is critical to the task of defining
the very essence of American culture."9 It is about who we are
and what we value. And it is about whether traditional religion is
still legitimate in, modem America. The decision whether to turn
our backs on millennia of moral teaching should be the product
of careful and thoughtful judgment and not of a subtle and ma-
nipulative campaign of propaganda.
this case to 'love the sinner and hate the sin.'" Maura Lerner, St. Cloud State's Department
Statement on Gays Causes Backlash, MINNEAPOuS STAR TRIBUNE, June 1, 1993, at 9A. Al-
though the position statement was modified following public criticism of its apparent
religious bigotry, it continues to state that students "who could not envision themselves
taking an active part in eliminating discrimination against gays and lesbians should con-
sider if they are appropriate candidates for the social work profession." Id.
79 HUNTER, supra note 1, at 177. Indeed, homosexual advocates agree with this as-
sessment. Andrew Sullivan calls equal access to marriage "the critical measure for full gay
equality." Sullivan, supra note 40, at 37. Societal acceptance of homosexual marriages, he
says, "is the highest public recognition of our personal integrity." Id. For a self-described
"counterhistory" of same-sex marriage, which concludes that homosexual unions "have
been valuable and productive across times and cultures," see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
History of Same-sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1511 (1993). See also Note, supra note
5, at 1906-07 (listing one example of discrimination caused by the "persistance of igno-
rance and misinformation" society's refusal to recognize homosexual attachments "as fami-
lies").
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III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAWS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Although the laws of at least twenty-three states continue to
classify homosexual sodomy as a criminal offense," a small but
increasing number of states recently have begun to move in the
opposite direction by enacting homosexual rights legislation. When
Minnesota enacted what has been called America's "most compre-
hensive gay rights law" in early 1993, it became the eighth state
to pass antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual inclinations and
behavior.8 2 A number of cities and counties also have passed simi-
lar restrictions on private employers and landlords."
However, a libertarian countertrend may be developing. Con-
gress has consistently rejected efforts to amend title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to cover sexual orientation as a protected
characteristic. 4 Moreover, in a statewide initiative in Colorado
and a number of local initiatives in Oregon, the people have act-
ed to protect themselves against gay rights restrictions.'
80 Sodomy remains a crime in twenty-three states as of the spring of 1993. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 to 13-1412 (Supp.
1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02 (1987); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3505 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
553-54 (1987); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338-750.338(b) (1979); MINN. STAT. §
609.293 (1988); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-505 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1
(1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-509
(1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-403 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie 1988). The Kentucky statute
criminalizing sodomy, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), was
declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). The
Massachusetts statute prohibiting "the abominable and detestable crime against nature,"
see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 34 (1986), was arguably invalidated as applied to private
consensual conduct by Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 302, 318 N.E.2d 478,
481 (1974). See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 9-10 n.2.
81 THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1993, at 26.
82 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51.7 (West 1982); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.1 (West 1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a to 46a-81r (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1, 378-
3 (1992 Supp.); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B §§ 3, 4 (1982); Act of April 2, 1993, 1993
MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 81 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 363 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12 (West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 143 (1985), tit. 9, §§ 4503-4504
(1984), tit. 21, § 495 (1987); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22, 111.32 (West 1988). See also
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2502, 1-2503 (1991).
83 A recent student Note reports that at least 139 jurisdictions have adopted some
form of homosexual rights legislation. Note, supra note 5, at 1906. For a list of these
jurisdictions, see id. at 1923-25.
84 See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 68-69.
85 Timothy Egan, Voters in Oregon Back Local Anti-Gay Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1993,
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Regardless of the trendline, homosexual rights legislation is
likely to remain in force in a number of states and localities for at
least the immediately foreseeable future, and in those jurisdictions
collisions of constitutional dimension will occur when government
seeks to enforce these restrictions against religiously-motivated
institutions and individuals. The remainder of this Article is devot-
ed to an analysis of this difficult issue.
A. The Impact of Smith on Free Exercise Exemptions From Homosexual
Rights Restrictions
In 1990, the Supreme Court cast aside almost three decades
of free exercise jurisprudence when it decided Employment Division
v. Smith.8 Under the traditional test applied by the Court in free
exercise cases, a governmental restriction that burdened the free
exercise of religion was valid only if the state justified it by estab-
lishing that it was the least restrictive means of achieving a com-
pelling or overriding government interest.17
The compelling interest test had been applied by a long line
of cases dating back almost thirty years to the Court's landmark
decision in Sherbert v. Verner.' In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a state's decision to withhold unemployment ben-
efits from a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Satur-
days based upon her sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court
clearly stated that this burden on the practice of religion could be
upheld only if the state established a "compelling" justification for
the regulation.89 Moreover, even if the state had made the re-
quired showing of a compelling interest, it also was required "to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation [would suffice
I
at A6. Similar grassroots campaigns to protect traditional family values are also being
waged in Arizona, California, Florida, Idah6, Michigan, Ohio, and "Washington. See Note,
supra note 5, at 1906.
86 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
87 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990). As Professor McConnell observes, although free exercise
doctrine was very protective of religious liberty during the pre-Smith period, in practice
"the Supreme Court only rarely sided with the free exercise claimant." Id.
88 374 U.S. 398 (1963). As a student commentator has observed, "[a]lmost a dozen
Supreme Court cases in the last twenty-five years have applied the test articulated in
Sherbert v. Verner... ." Note, Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 200 (1990). See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employ.
ment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
89 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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to accomplish this overriding purpose] without infringing First
Amendment rights."" Since the state was unable to meet this dif-
ficult test, the Court held that the denial of unemployment bene-
fits violated Sherbert's rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
However, the Court completely rewrote the law of free exer-
cise in 1990 when it decided Smith. The facts of Smith, sometimes
referred to as the "peyote case," are simple. Two members of the
Native American Church, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were
denied unemployment benefits after being fired from their jobs as
drug counselors. The benefits were denied because Smith and
Black had been discharged for work-related misconduct-their
illegal use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote for sacramental pur-
poses at a ceremony of their church."
Smith and Black claimed that the denial of the benefits was
an unconstitutional burden on their free exercise of religion, be-
cause it penalized them for taking part in what to them was a
religious sacrament.92 Although the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the state may neither, consistent with the First Amendment,
prohibit good faith use of peyote in a religious ceremony nor
deny unemployment compensation to persons whose unemploy-
ment results from their exercise of religious freedom," the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court reversed the Oregon decision, upheld
the denial of benefits and, at least for the present, rejected the
compelling interest test for most (but, significantly, not all) free
exercise challenges.
Since the use of peyote was a crime under Oregon law, the
question before the Court was whether "that prohibition is permis-
sible under the Free Exercise Clause."94 Justice Scalia, writing for
a fivejudge majority, stated that "the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes).'" In other words, so long as its laws are neutral
90 Id. at 407.
91 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). The use of peyote was
illegal under Oregon's criminal code. See id at 875-76.
92 Id. at 876.
93 See Smith v. Employment Division, 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988); McConnell, supra
note 87, at 1111.
94 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
95 Id. at 879, quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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and generally applicable, government may prohibit that which
religion requires, or require that which religion prohibits. There is
no need to satisfy the compelling interest test." Accommodation
of religious conscience is left to the wisdom (or the whim) of
state legislatures and political majorities. In effect, the Supreme
Court has closed its doors to religious claimants seeking exemp-
tions from neutral laws of general application that incidentally
burden the free exercise of religion.97
Although Smith has a few scholarly defenders,98 the general
view among the commentators is that the decision is seriously
flawed as a matter of textual interpretation,99 historical analy-
sis," and in its understanding of free exercise precedents."'
96 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2226 (1993).
97 See id.
98 " See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism 58 U.
CHi. L. REv. 308 (1991). See also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
Coipelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 357 (1989-90). Even Professor Mar-
shall, while applauding Smith's results, acknowledges that the opinion of the Court "is
neither persuasive nor well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exer-
cise jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction." Marshall, supra, 58 U.
Cm. L. REV. at 308-09.
99 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercis 1990 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 3 (footnotes
omitted):
The early published reactions to Smith also make the point that the deci-
sion is inconsistent with the apparent meaning of the constitutional text. The
Court concedes that religious conduct is the exercise of religion, and it accurate-
ly describes the law at issue as a "criminal prohibition" of this religious exercise.
On its face, such a law would seem to be a "law prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." The Court does not really dispute the point; it says only that this is
not the only "permissible" meaning of the text.
See also McConnell, supra note 87, at 1114-16; Note, supra note 88, at 202.
100 Justice Souter questioned Smith's fidelity to the history of free exercise in his
concurring opinion last term in Hialeah.
There appears to be a strong argument from the Clause's development in the
First Congress, from its origins in the post-Revolution state constitutions and pre-
Revolution colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to which the
Framers adhered, that the Clause was originally understood to preserve a right
to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's God, unless those
activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs of the State. If, as
this scholarship suggests, the Free Exercise Clause's original "purpose [was] to
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by
civil authority," School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 223 ... , then
there would be powerful reason to interpret the Clause to accord with its natu-
ral reading, as applying to all laws prohibiting religious exercise in fact, not just
those aimed at its prohibition, and to hold the neutrality needed to implement
such a pinrpose to be the substantive neutrality of our pre-Smith cases, not the
formal neutrality sufficient for constitutionality under Smith.
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Even more troubling than the opinion's analytical shortcomings is
its impact on the quality of religious freedom. As Professor Doug-
las Laycock has observed, "[i]f the Court intends to defer to any
formally neutral law restricting religion, then it has created a legal
framework for persecution, and persecutions will result.""0 2
If the general rule coming from Smith is that free exercise has
been banished from the Bill of Rights, it is critically important
that we pay attention to the exceptions recognized by the Court to
this general rule of non-protection. For purposes of the protection
of religiously-motivated conduct,0 3 these exceptions are two in
number.
First, as the Court stated most recently in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,' "[a] law burdening religious
practice that is not neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.""0 5 Second, the Smith
Court stated that the First Amendment bars application of even a
neutral and generally applicable law "to religiously motivated ac-
tion" in cases involving what the Court referred to as "hybrid"
claims-i.e., claims under which free exercise is "reinforced" by
another constitutional interest such as free speech, association, or
the right of parents to direct the education of their children.0 0
Since these two exceptions now constitute the primary source of
113 S. Ct. at 2249 (Souter, J., concurring). See also McConnell, supra note 87, at 1116-19;
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L REV. 1409 (1990); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty And The Call Of
Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 71, 79-85 (1992). 'But see Philip A. Hamburger, A Consti-
tutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915
(1992); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions And The Siren Song of Liberalism,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
101 See McConnell, supra note 87, at 1124-27. The Court relied most heavily on
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), a case which allowed public
schools to require religious dissenters to participate in a daily flag-salute ceremony. Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Justice Scalia's majority opinion
somehow failed to notice that Gobitis had been overruled, only three years after it was
decided, in the landmark case of West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). As Professor McConnell observed, "[r]elying on Gobitis without mentioning
Barnette is like relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion." McConnell, supra note 87, at 1124.
102 Laycock, supra note 99, at 4.
103 Smith recognizes that the Free Exercise Clause continues to protect the right of
religious belief as distinct from religiously-motivated conduct. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
104 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). Hialeah is the first post-Smith free exercise decision of the
Court.
105 Id. at 2233.
106 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
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religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause, the remainder
of this Article will analyze their application in cases, involving re-
strictions on religious conscience07 created by enforcement of
homosexual rights legislation.
B. Are Homosexual Rights Laws "Neutral" and "Generally Applicable"?
Smith holds that the government's power "to enforce [neutral
and] generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct"
does not require a compelling justification under the Free Exer-
cise Clause even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
religiously-motivated practices.108 But when government restricts
religious freedom by a law which fails to satisfy the requirements
of neutrality and general applicability, the Court has stated force-
fully that a rigorous and undiluted standard of strict scrutiny will
be applied."9 Since these requirements are now the principal
constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience,
it is particularly important that the Court give them meaningful
content.110
107 James Madison believed that the "unalienable right" of freedom of conscience is
"precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Soci-
ety." James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 7 (Marvin Meyers
ed., rev. ed. 1981). Madison's argument in Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments is regarded by the Supreme Court and numerous commentators "as the single
most authoritative source for understanding the meaning of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment." Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Exami-
nation Of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 191, 192 n.7 (1992). Professor
Durham recently discussed the significance of Madison's views:
Madison's picture portrays religious liberty as a matter of interacting sover-
eigns-the Creator as the ultimate source of conscientious obligation, the individ-
ual as the vessel of conscience, and civil society as an artificial construct whose
very existence is conditioned and bounded by preexisting obligations set up by
the other two sources of sovereignty. Significantly, liberty of conscience is in no
sense derivative from the state. Exemptions for conscientious conduct are not
bestowed as a matter of grace by the state, nor are they the functional equiv-
alent of aid, subsidization, or preferred treatment. They are simply reserved
spheres of free conduct built into the original structure of the social compact.
Durham, supra note 100, at 82.
108 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).
109 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233 ("The compelling interest standard that we apply once
a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not 'water[ed] . . . down' but 'really means
what it says.'").
110 See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948).
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1. Are Homosexual Rights Laws Religiously Neutral?
Although the Court did not precisely define what it meant by
"neutral" laws in Smith, it did provide some guidance in Smith and
even more in Hialeah. We know, for example, that a law that is
specifically directed at a religious practice, such as a law that bans
the casting of "statues that are to be used for worship purposes,"
is not neutral."' On the other hand, if prohibiting the exercise
of religion is not the object of a law "but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision," the
neutrality requirement apparently will be met."2 The Court ap-
pears to be saying that "formal neutrality, along with general appli-
cability, are sufficient conditions for constitutionality under the
Free Exercise Clause.""'
Formal neutrality is probably satisfied if a legal restriction
neither singles out religious practices for special burdens nor
adopts classifications which discriminate among classes of religious
believers. For example, an across-the-board prohibition of posses-
sion and consumption of alcoholic beverages is formally neutral
even though it incidentally criminalizes the sacramental use of
wine."4 For purposes of Smith, it makes no difference that the
law is aimed at alcoholic beverages rather than at peyote."'
Suppose a law targets religion by forbidding only the sacra-
mental use of alcoholic beverages. Again this is an easy case under
Smith and Hialeah-such a law is neither religiously neutral nor
generally applicable."6
Now consider Prohibition with an exception that allows orga-
nized religious groups (but not individuals) to possess sacramental
111 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
112 Id. at 878.
113 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring). The term "formal neutrality"
basically adopts a "standard of no religious classifications." See Douglas Laycock, Formal;
Substantive, And Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999
(1990). Substantive neutrality on the other hand goes beyond the face of a law and
examines its effects. It asks whether government action "encourages or discourages reli-
gious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." Id. at
1001. Substantive neutrality is satisfied "when government encouragement and discourage-
ment [of religious belief or practice] is minimized." Id at 1002. An across-the-board pro-
hibition of the use of peyote thus satisfies the requirements of formal neutrality, but
probably fails the test of substantive neutrality as applied to the sacramental use of peyo-
te by members of the Native American Church. Id at 1003.
114 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. See also Laycock, supra note 113, at 1000.
115 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877, 885.
116 Id. at 877-78; Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226-27.
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wine for use in religious rites.117 Also suppose this law is being
enforced against an individual who wishes to use sacramental wine
at home for weekly communion with his family. When the individ-
ual asserts a free exercise claim against this governmental burden
on his religious worship, does the compelling interest test apply or
should his claim be rejected because the burden on his religious
exercise is only an incidental effect of a neutral law of general
applicability?
The starting point is the Court's statement in Hialeah that
"[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause per-
tain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious
beliefs ... ."8 Clearly, Prohibition with an exemption for Cath-
olics (but not for other denominations) would fail this test of
neutrality and would therefore require a compelling justifica-
tion."' At least arguably, the example of Prohibition with an ex-
emption only for organized religious groups is similarly lacking
neutrality-sacramental wine is permitted to members of organized
religions who wish to celebrate communion in the sanctuary but is
forbidden to those who sincerely wish to worship God by celebrat-
ing communion at home with members of their family. Since this
law is not neutral, its application against individual believers must
"undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."' Further supporting
this argument is the Court's reliance, in both Smith and Hialeah,
on McDaniel v. Paty" as an example of a law that fails neutrality
because it imposes "special disabilities on the basis of religious
views or religious status."" Just as it undermines neutrality for
117 For example, the National Prohibition Act contained an exemption for sacramen-
tal use of alcoholic beverages but expressly prohibited the sale of sacramental alcohol "to
any person not a rabbi, minister of the gospel, priest, or an officer duly authorized for
the purpose by any church or congregation .... " National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 6,
41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919) (repealed 1933).
118 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
119 Id. The Court cited Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1961) as an example of
governmental action that failed the test of neutrality. In Fowler, the Court held that a
municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional manner when interpreted to
prohibit preaching in a public park by a Jehovah's Witness but to permit preaching by
other denominations.
120 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
121 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a Tennessee law that disqualified members of
the clergy from serving as legislators).
122 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226. It is important to note that
the problem in McDaniel was not denominational non-neutrality because the law expressly
applied to clergy "of any denomination whatever." McDanie, 435 U.S. at 620. It was dis-
crimination based upon religious status (e.g., member of the clergy) that destroyed the
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the state to discriminate against members of the clergy because of
their status as such, arguably it also destroys neutrality when the
state exempts the religiously motivated behavior of religious insti-
tutions (but not that of religious individuals) from restrictive legis-
lation like the hypothetical Prohibition law. 2 '
Now, how does this analysis relate to the question whether
typical homosexual rights laws are religiously neutral? An across-
the-board prohibition of all employment and housing discrimina-
tion by all classes of employers and landlords, like the hypothetical
Prohibition law with no exceptions, should pass the test of formal
neutrality. Such a law neither targets religious conduct for special
disabilities, nor creates religious classifications which discriminate
among classes of religious believers.124
But now consider a statute, like that of Vermont,"s which
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation and provides an exemption for "any religious or denomina-
tional institution or organization" to make employment decisions
which are "calculated by the organization to promote the religious
principles for which it is established or maintained."'26 Is such a
law religiously neutral when enforced against Mike Strong, the
hypothetical owner of a Christian book store, who wishes to run
his business in accordance with his sincerely held religious be-
liefs?'27 Remember, Mr. Strong considers his business a ministry
and seeks to use it as a witness to the community of Biblical busi-
ness ethics. Therefore, he. has dismissed an employee because he
neutrality of the Tennessee statute.
123 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Frazee held
that free exercise protects the religiously motivated conduct of individual believers and
specifically rejected "the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause,
one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization." Id at
834.
124 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
125 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1992).
126 The exception reads in full as follows:
The provisions of this section prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation shall not be construed to prohibit or prevent any religious or
denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for
charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised, or controlled
by or in connection with a religious organization, from giving preference to
persons of the same religion or denomination or from taking any action with
respect to matters of employment which is calculated by the organization to pro-
mote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(e) (Supp. 1992).
127 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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believes her homosexual lifestyle is inconsistent with the personal
integrity and character that he expects his employees to model for
his customers and the community.
128
This case is similar in all material respects to our hypothetical
case of Prohibition with an exemption only for religious institu-
tions." And like that case, the Vermont employment statute ap-
pears to fail the test of religious neutrality, because its exemption
provision creates a religious classification-religiously-motivated
employment decisions based upon sexual orientation are allowed
when made by religious institutions but prohibited when made by
religious individuals. The State of Vermont's attempt to enforce its
restrictive law against Strong's religious conscience should be de-
nied unless the state is able to establish a compelling justification
for its statutory scheme."'
If this argument about the concept of religious neutrality
under the Smith doctrine is correct, it means that religious exemp-
tions from otherwise general government burdens must be "non-
discriminatory""'-i.e., they must be all or nothing. Partial reli-
gious exemptions for some classes of believers destroy neutrality
and entitle believers left unprotected by the exemption to strict
scrutiny. This result seems consistent with the reasoning of Smith
and its emphasis on equal protection of religious exercise. 2 It
also ensures that a political consensus for homosexual rights laws
and other restrictive legislation cannot be built by trading exemp-
tions to powerful religious institutions in exchange for their sup-
port or silence."
128 IL
129 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
130 Id. For an analysis of the compelling interest test in the context of homosexual
rights legislation that burdens free exercise, see infra notes 172-204 and accompanying
text.
131 Although Smith holds that the Free Exercise Clause does not require legislatures
to enact exemptions for religiously-motivated conduct, the Court expressly stated that "a
nondiscriminatry religious-practice exemption is permitted." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (empha-
sis added).
132 See Laycock, supra note 99, at 11 (Smith adopts "an equal protection rule" for free
exercise).
133 Powerful religious institutions might oppose homosexual rights legislation if it
applied to them, but might withdraw their opposition in exchange for an exemption for
religious institutions. Religious neutrality and general applicability forbid these attempts to
piece together a political consensus by buying off opposition with partial exemptions.
This protection for religious minorities against partial exemption is necessary whether the
exemptions discriminate along denominational lines or between institutional and individu-
al believers. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
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Smith seems to be based on the notion that religious freedom
is sufficiently protected by laws that treat religiously-motivated
persons no better (and no worse) than anyone else. Although I
believe free exercise properly understood requires more,
34 I
most certainly believe it requires no less than a kind of most-fa-
vored-nation status for religious minorities "caught in conflict with
our secular political culture."1 5 If government chooses to exempt
only some religious believers from restrictive laws, religiously moti-
vated persons left unprotected by the limited exemption are enti-
tled to rigorous protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
2. Are Homosexual Rights Laws Generally Applicable?
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated and
"failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the
other has not been satisfied."3 6 However, the Court has treated
them as two separate requirements, each serving a different pur-
pose."3 ' The purpose of the neutrality requirement is to trigger
strict scrutiny whenever governmental restrictions target religion or
discriminate among classes of religiously-motivated actors."3 8 The
requirement that laws burdening religious practice must be of
general applicability, however, is aimed primarily at governmental
restrictions that discriminate between religious and secular
behavior-a law is generally applicable if it treats religiously-
motivated conduct no worse than its secular counterparts.'39
General applicability becomes an issue whenever a regulatory
scheme provides exemptions for some reasons but not for reli-
gious reasons.
Returning to our hypothetical Prohibition law, assume that
Prohibition is enacted and exemptions are provided only for home
consumption and for small, private clubs with less than forty mem-
134 1 support pre-Smith law which required all governmental burdens on religiously-
motivated conduct to undergo a compelling interest test. See supra notes 88-90 and ac-
companying text.
135 See McConnell, supra note 87, at 1152. As Professor McConnell points out, al-
though non-mainstream believers are most at risk to be caught in the net of the modern
regulatory state, on occasion any person with religious convictions may need the protec-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. Id
136 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
137 Id. at 2226-33.
138 See supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
139 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2232 (stating that free exercise protects religious observers
against unequal treatment).
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bers. Are religious congregations entitled to strict scrutiny when
they raise a free exercise claim against Prohibition's application to
them and their desire to use wine for sacramental purposes?
Clearly, if a law is so riddled with secular exemptions that it
restricts only conduct with a religious motivation, the law is neither
neutral nor generally applicable.14 But what of a law, like the
hypothetical one we are discussing, that provides exemptions for
only a few secular classes? Does the existence of any exemption
scheme that discriminates against religiously-motivated behavior
take the case out of Smith and trigger strict scrutiny?
Neither Smith nor Hialeah resolve the issue with certainty, but
both cases can be read as supporting the argument that "the al-
lowance of any exemption is substantial evidence that religious
exemptions would not threaten the statutory scheme."' Smith,
for example, cites Sherbert and the other unemployment cases as
standing for the proposition "that where the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling rea-
son."' Although part of the Court's concern was with the dan-
ger of excessive administrative discretion in schemes involving
"individualized governmental assessment" of exemptions,'43 abuse
of discretion is not the only (nor even the primary) concern of
the requirement of general applicability. As Justice Kennedy stated
in his opinion for the Court in Hialeah, protecting religious ob-
servers against unequal treatment is the central goal of the re-
quirement and, therefore, "categories of selection are of para-
mount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening
religious practice."" Smith may have reduced free exercise to a
140 i&
141 Laycock, supra note 99, at 50. "The state may conceivably have a compelling rea-
son for denying some claims to religious exemption even though it grants other exemp-
tions, but such cases should be quite rare." Id.
142 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
143 Id. In American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir.
1991), the court held that the Immigration Reform and Control Act was generally appli-
cable even though it contains exceptions for large classes of persons. The court conclud-
ed that because "those exeptions exclude entire, objectively-defined categories of employ-
ees from the scope of the statute" they are not "individualized exemptions" within the
meaning of Smith and the doctrine of general application. Id. at 1408. See also
Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990). The con-
clusions in both of these cases were reached, as Justice Stevens might say, with hardly a
whisper of analysis regarding the principle of general applicability and its relationship to
equal protection of free exercise of religion. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
144 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2232. Restrictions that are underinclusive-by failing to pro-
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rule of equal treatment for religious observers, but when equality
is lacking the Free Exercise Clause still has teeth and requires that
religious observers be treated no worse than other classes recog-
nized by the regulatory scheme.
If this analysis is correct, the Prohibition law under discussion
requires a compelling justification, because the scheme of exemp-
tions discriminates against religious congregations seeking access to
wine for sacramental purposes. This is the correct result because if
free exercise means anything after Smith, it should not permit a
state to prefer social and in-the-home use of alcoholic beverages
over sacramental use by church congregations. Properly under-
stood, Smith means that religious observers must live by the same
rules as everyone else in society. But when legislative majorities
begin handing out exemptions to various classes of persons, reli-
gious observers are entitled to equal exemptions.
Now let's apply this analysis to homosexual rights laws. Typi-
cally, these laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in employment and housing, but also contain a num-
ber of exemptions for various classes of persons. Although these
statutes usually contain an exemption for religious institutions,
they do not provide a general exemption for religiously-motivated
behavior by non-institutional believers.145 Are these laws "general-
ly applicable" under the Free Exercise Clause and the Smith doc-
trine?
For example, Connecticut forbids landlords from making
distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation, but exempts owner
occupied dwellings "containing not more than four units." 4 ' Sim-
ilarly, California prohibits employers from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation but defines "employer" to exempt those
who regularly employ fewer than five persons,14 " and Minnesota's
statute contains an exemption for the employment of domestic
servants.1 48 None of these regulatory restrictions contain exemp-
tions for religious individuals who wish to manage their businesses
hibit non-religious conduct that endangers governmental interests "in a similar or greater
degree" than the restricted religiously-motivated conduct-do not satisfy the requirement
of general applicability. See id.
145 See supra statutes cited at note 82. For a discussion analyzing exemptions which
discriminate between institutional and individual religious actors, see supra notes 111-35
and accompanying text.
146 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81e(b) (West Supp. 1993).
147 CAL LAB. CODE § 1102.1(b)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
148 1993 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 82 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. 1992 § 363.02(1)
(1992)).
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and properties in accordance with deeply-held religious beliefs
concerning the morality of homosexual behavior. Are these laws
generally applicable?
If Smith is serious about protecting religious freedom against
unequal governmental burdens, the answer must be that none of
these laws is generally applicable because all of them create un-
equal exemptions. Consider our earlier hypothetical involving Mrs.
McCabe, the elderly widow who owns and manages a five-plex
apartment building.149 As a devout Roman Catholic, she believes
that it is sinful for her to rent an apartment in her building to
unmarried homosexual or heterosexual cohabiting couples. Under
the Connecticut statute discussed above, she is guilty of a crime if
she follows her religious beliefs and refuses to rent an apartment
to homosexual cohabitants. However, the owner of a neighboring
four-unit apartment building is entitled to a statutory exemption
so long as he resides in the building. Although this exemption
may be reasonable in its attempt to protect the autonomy and
associational interests of small landlords, the Free Exercise Clause
demands that Mrs. McCabe's religiously-motivated behavior be
given the same treatment unless the state has a compelling justifi-
cation for its scheme of unequal exemptions.
Likewise, the California and Minnesota statutes are not gener-
ally applicable as applied to Mike Strong, the owner of the Chris-
tian book store. Since Strong's book store employs ten workers, if
it were located in California Strong would not be covered by the
exemption for employers of fewer than five persons. And if his
business were located in Minnesota, Strong's book store would not
qualify for the domestic servants exemption. The result in both
states is the same-religious exercise is restrided while some other
interests are not. Althohgh there may be good reasons for Califor-
nia to protect small businesses and for Minnesota to protect the
autonomy of employers of domestic servants, the decision to give
these interests .protection denied to religious observers ought to
trigger rigorous scrutiny under what remains of the Free Exercise
Clause in the wake of Smith.
C. Do Homosexual Rights Restrict Smith "Hybrid" Claims?
In Smith, the Court recognized one class of free exercise
claims that continues to require even neutral and generally appli-
149 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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cable laws to pass the compelling interest test-so-called "hybrid"
claims in which the Free Exercise Clause is reinforced by another
constitutional interest such as free speech, association, or the right
of parents to control the education of their children.' 0 As a stu-
dent commentator has observed, the free exercise hybrid doctrine
appears to have been created to distinguish away cases, such as
Wisconsin v. Yoder,' which were seemingly inconsistent with the
general rule of Smith."' Yoder, of course, is the 1972 decision in
which the Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory attendance laws
could not be enforced against Old Order Amish parents who, for
religious reasons, declined to send their children to public or
private school beyond the eighth grade.' Although Yoder had
always been regarded as one of the Court's landmark free exercise
cases, Justice Scalia practiced alchemy on it in Smith and it
emerged not as a free exercise case but as a "hybrid" linking free
exercise to the right of parents "to direct the education of their
children."154
Exactly what is this new invention of Justice Scalia and the
majority in Smith? What is a hybrid case? If a party already has a
constitutional claim under the Free Speech or Due Process Clause,
what is the significance of linking that claim with a free exercise
claim? What does the free exercise clause add to the equation?
Clearly, what the Court must have meant is that a less than
sufficient free exercise claim, plus a less than sufficient claim aris-
ing under a different part of the Constitution, together trigger the
150 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. See generally Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional
Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurispru-
dence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833 (1993).
151 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
152 See Fry, supra note 150, at 835. See also McConnell, supra note 87, at 1121 ("One
suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of distin-
guishing Yoder.") The hybrid concept may not be an entirely new idea in constitutional
law. It might, for example, explain how the Court, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), found a right to possess obscene publications in the home. Although Stanley in-
volved a lawful search under the Fourth Amendment and obscene materials which gener-
ally are not protected by the First Amendment, the Court held that possession of ob-
scene material in the privacy of one's home could not constitutionally be made a crime.
Id. at 559, 568. The Court expressly indicated that the case had an "added dimension"
because a privacy interest was linked to a free speech interest. Id. at 564. The arithmetic
of Stanley goes something like this: "First amendment satisfied plus fourth amendment
satisfied equals Constitution unsatisfied." See Gerard V. Bradley, Remaking the Constitution:
A Critical Reexamination of the Bowers v. Hardwick Dissent, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501,
512 (1990).
153 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-15, 234-35.
154 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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compelling interest test. In other words, the cumulative effect of
two or more partial constitutional rights equals one sufficient
constitutional claim. Professor Mark Tushnet agrees with this analy-
sis and explains the hybrid process this way:
It is important to understand that this model makes sense only
on the assumption that the second claim standing alone would
also not trigger the [compelling interest test], for otherwise it
is the second claim alone, and without any contribution from
the Free Exercise claim, that does the work ....
The idea underlying this... distinction, then, must be
that there are "interests" related to values protected by the
Constitution which are not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution, and that sometimes these interests can be added
together to yield the equivalent of a constitutional right.'55
A good example of a hybrid claim at work is contained in the
recent decision of a federal district court in Alabama and Coushatta
Tribes of Texas v. Big Sandy School District.56 Big Sandy involved a
free exercise challenge by Native American students to a generally
applicable school hair code that required boys to grow their hair
"no longer than the top of a standard dress collar.""5 7 The court
avoided the general rule of Smith by noting that the plaintiffs'
claim was a Smith-hybrid, because their free exercise claim158 was
reinforced both by a free speech claim and by a parental rights
claim.'59 The court concluded that since the Native American
students had established a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, they were entitled to a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the hair regulation."6°
In Smith, the Court said hybrid claims will be recognized in at
least three circumstances: (1) when a free exercise claim is linked
to a free speech or free press claim; (2) when a free exercise
claim is linked to a claim of freedom of association; and (3) when
155 Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is there a Constitutional Difference, 1991
U. CH. LEGAL FORUM 43, 71-72. But see Fry, supra note 150, at 847: "Subsequent lower
court case law has interpreted Justice Scalia's hybrid situation to require free exercise
claimants to assert free speech rights that are strong enough that, were they standing
alone, they would be sufficient claims." The same author recognizes, quite correctly, that
this narrow interpretation of the hybrid exception "may not be mandated by Smith." Id.
156 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
157 Id. at 1323.
158 Plaintiffs alleged that they had sincerely held religious beliefs regarding the spiri-
tual significance of wearing long hair. I. at 1324-26.
159 Id. at 1332-36.
160 Id. at 1336.
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a free exercise claim is linked to a claim based upon the right of
parents to direct the education of their children as recognized in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters61 and Yoder. 62 Although litigants should
always attempt to hybridize their free exercise claims by linking
them to another constitutional interest, the hybrid doctrine proba-
bly will not provide much protection to most religious observers
challenging homosexual rights laws.
For example, in our hypothetical cases,' neither Mr. Strong
nor Mrs. McCabe appears to have a hybrid claim-their free exer-
cise claims appear unrelated to either free speech or parental
rights concerns, and any attempt to link free exercise with free-
dom of association is likely to be unpersuasive in cases involving
commercial enterprises.' Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court
will recognize a hybrid claim if Strong and McCabe attempt to
link free exercise to unenumerated property rights.'6
However, one class of our hypothetical litigants, Holy Savior
School and the parents of children attending the school, appears
161 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court struck down an Oregon law that re-
quired most children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school. Id.
at 530-31. The Court held that the Oregon legislation unreasonably interfered "with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children un-
der their control." Id.' at 534-35. The unanimous opinion of the Court recognized this
parental right regarding education as a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It. at 535. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). The leading modem case recognizing this parental right is Wisconsin v.
Yoder, in which the Court noted that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1992). Although Pierce grounded parental rights in substantive due
process, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), the Court declared that
this liberty is also rooted in free speech.
162 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. For a recent decision finding a free-exercise/parental-rights
hybrid in the context of a home school case, see People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127
(Mich. 1993).
163 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
164 The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right of association in two
distinct senses, neither of which seems applicable to Strong and McCabe's commercial
activities. First, "the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain
intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State."
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). Second, "the Court has
recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected
by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and
the exercise of religion." Id. at 618. Neither Strong's desire to choose his employees, nor
McCabe's wish to select her tenants, implicates the freedom of association as defined by
the Court. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTUnONAL LAW § 16.41, at
1063 (4th ed. 1991).
165 See American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir.
1992) (no hybrid claim stated when free exercise linked to substantive due process "right
to employ").
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to have a classic hybrid claim under Smith. Their free exercise
claim is reinforced by all three of the interests mentioned in
Smith-by the right of parental choice in education," by the
free speech principle that the state may not "contract the spec-
trum of available knowledge" by restricting educational alternatives
such as an authentically religious education,"" and by the free-
dom of expressive association'6
Finally, one other situation in which a hybrid claim may be
available to an employer or landlord challenging a homosexual
rights ordinance could involve a statute which attempts to regulate
not only conduct, but also speech. For example, the Hawaii em-
ployment discrimination law provides that it is an unlawful discrim-
inatory practice for any employer "to print, circulate, or cause to
be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publica-
tion... which expresses, directly or indirectly, any... discrimina-
tion.""6 Obviously, a religious employer charged with violating
this provision for making statements about the immorality of ho-
mosexuality would have a strong free speech claim. 70 But he
would also have a textbook hybrid claim in which free exercise is
reinforced by free speech."'
D. Do Homosexual Rights Laws Pass Strict Scrutiny?
A law restricting religious exercise that falls outside Smith's
general rule of judicial deference because it fails the test of neu-
trality and general applicability-or, presumably, because it bur-
166 See supra note 161.
167 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
168 See supra note 164. Holy Savior School is a pervasively religious school founded to
provide students with an education from an orthodox Christian perspective and to em-
ploy teachers and staff members to serve as role models of the Christian life. See supra
text accompanying note 5. Therefore, it is exactly the kind of "collective effort on behalf
of shared goals" envisioned by the Court as protected by the freedom of association. Rob-
erts, 468 U.S. at 622. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Obviously, the
primary purpose of the collective effort at Holy Savior School is an expressive one, the
teaching and learning of knowledge about God's world from God's perspective. As the
Court noted in Roberts, protection of these expressive communities "is especially important
in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
169 HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(C) (1992 Supp.)
170 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct 2538 (1992). See also Kingsley R. Browne,
Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harrassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST.
UJ. 481 (1991); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on
Free Speech and Sexual Harrassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993).
171 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
1994] 433
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
dens a hybrid interest-"must undergo the most rigorous of scruti-
ny."72 The Court went out of its way in Hialeah to emphasize
that "[t]he compelling interest standard that we apply once a law
fails to meet the Smith requirements is not 'water[ed] .... down'
but 'really means what it says.""' 7 Thus, homosexual rights laws
that trigger strict scrutiny upon impact with a qualified free exer-
cise claim will be upheld only if they further a governmental inter-
est of the highest order and are "narrowly tailored in pursuit of
those interests." 74 The Court went so far as to suggest that such
laws "will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases." 75 If my analy-
sis is correct in its conclusion that most homosexual rights laws
will trigger strict scrutiny under Smith when challenged by reli-
giously-motivated employers and landlords, 76 then there is every
reason to believe that these restrictions are unconstitutional.
Are homosexual rights laws capable of passing through the
gauntlet of superlatives required by an undiluted test of strict
scrutiny? Are these laws really the least restrictive means of effec-
tuating a truly compelling governmental interest?
In Bob Jones University v. United States, 7  the University, a
nondenominational school with what the Court called a "funda-
mentalist Christian" world view,7 was denied tax exempt status
due to its policy forbidding interracial dating. Although the Court
determined that the denial of tax benefits available to other edu-
cational institutions had a "substantial impact" on the University's
free exercise of religion, 79 this burden was justified by the
government's "fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating ra-
cial discrimination in education."' The Court suggested that the
172 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233
(1993).
173 Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888). Thus, although Smith constricted the reach
of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court has made clear that "within this narrowed field,
the degree of protection has been intensified." Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State at 15, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948).
174 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
175 Id.
176 Most such laws trigger strict scrutiny because they are either not neutral or not
generally applicable. See supra notes 108-49 and accompanying text. Moreover, at least a
few applications of these laws will burden Smith-hybrid claims. See supra notes 150-71 and
accompanying text.
177 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
178 Id. at 580.
179 Id. at 603-04.
180 Id. at 604.
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government's interest in eliminating racial discrimination was truly
extraordinary, because "[flew social or political issues in our histo-
ry have been more vigorously debated and more extensively venti-
lated than the issue of racial discrimination, particularly in educa-
tion.""81 As one commentator recently observed, the decisive fac-
tor in Bob Jones was that a religious community challenged the cor-
rectness of a public policy "to which the legal and political system
is deeply committed, and on which the prestige of the modem
Supreme Court is largely based."'82 Indeed, the Court in Bob
Jones cited an unbroken line of its past decisions that "establishes
beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination in educa-
tion violates a most fundamental national public policy. " s
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,'84 the Court provided an
even clearer picture of its view of the compelling interest .test in
the context of antidiscrimination laws. Roberts concerned a conflict
between the State of Minnesota's "efforts to eliminate gender-
based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional
freedom of association asserted by members of a private organiza-
tion." " The Court held that the state's "compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens" justified its
law requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting mem-'
bers.18
6
The Court noted that discrimination on the basis of gender is
"invidious" and produces "special harms"'8 7 because it is based
upon "archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs
and capacities of the sexes" and therefore "forces individuals to
labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship
181 Id. at 595.
182 McConnell, supra note 107, at 203.
183 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593. In his concurring opinion in a similar case involving
racial discrimination by a private religious school, Circuit Judge Goldberg explained the
compelling justification for laws prohibiting racial discrimination:
The constitutional imperative to eliminate the badges of slavery has not dimmed
in the 114 years since President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.
The compelling governmental interest in moving nearer that noble goal over-
rides appellant's interest in preserving a "very minor" religious practice.
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 324 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1053 (1978).
184 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
185 Id. at 612.
186 Id. at 623.
187 Id. at 628.
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to their actual abilities."" In other words, gender-like
race-tells us nothing about a person's character or abilities. Peo-
ple should be judged on the "content of their character" not on
their gender or on the color of their skin."9 The Minnesota law
prohibited the Jaycees from relying on "unsupported generaliza-
tions" about gender, 0' but left them free "to exclude individuals
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members." 9'
Under Roberts then, there is a crucial difference between dis-
crimination based upon racial and gender stereotypes, and dis-
crimination on the basis of more reliable evidence of character
and aptitude. For example, discrimination against members of a
particular race or gender based on the unsupported generalization
that the particular group is "shiftless and lazy" is invidious discrim-
ination which the state has a compelling interest to eradicate.
However, discrimination against individuals who identify themselves
as being shiftless and lazy, perhaps by marching in a parade under
the banner "shiftless, lazy, and proud," is not invidious and the
state has no compelling reason to intervene.
In the only decision of an appellate court to reach the issue
whether there is a compelling justification for homosexual rights
laws, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,'92 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that the District of Columbia
ordinance was justified because "[a] homosexual orientation tells
nothing reliable about abilities or commitments in work, religion,
politics, personal and social relationships, or social activi-
ties . . . ."' Unfortunately, the court did not explain this highly
controversial conclusion. Did the court mean that homosexual
conduct of various sorts is irrelevant to character? If homosexual
conduct is morally. neutral then it would seem to follow that ho-
mosexual inclinations are morally neutral. But if it is reasonable to
believe that homosexual behavior is morally significant and reflects
on a person's character, then why isn't it also reasonable to be-
lieve that homosexual orientation is a good proxy for homosexual
behavior (and, thus, at least a reasonably reliable predictor of
character).
188 Id. at 625.
189 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
190 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
191 Id. at 627.
192 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
193 I& at 35.
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Suppose, for example, that an applicant for employment in-
forms the employer that he is gay. Or suppose an employer sees
an employee marching in a gay pride parade while carrying a sign
which states "I'm gay and I'm proud." Or suppose two male appli-
cants for an apartment are seen kissing in the hallway by the man-
ager of the complex. Although in none of these examples did
anyone witness same-gender genital contact, in each of them the
decision maker is relying on much more than "unsupported gener-
alizations" or "stereotypical notions" to quote the Court in Rob-
erts 194
Recently, the issue before the Seventh Circuit, in a case in-
volving the military's ban of homosexuals, was the significance of a
person's admission that she is a lesbian.195 The court concluded
that this admission of sexual orientation
if not an admission of its practice, at least can rationally and
reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and pro-
pensity to engage in homosexual conduct. Such an assumption
cannot be said to be without individual exceptions, but it is
compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and is likely
to again engage in such conduct. To this extent, therefore, the
regulation does not classify plaintiff based merely upon her
status as a lesbian, but upon reasonable inferences about her
probable conduct in the past and in the future."6
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning is more persuasive than that of
the D.C. court in the Georgetown case. Discrimination on the basis
of homosexual orientation is not invidious-it is a rational and
reasonable attempt to take into account the character of a person
who has a propensity to engage in morally controversial behav-
ior.1
97
194 See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
195 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Ben-Sha-
lom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
196 Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464.
197 A recent statement of "observations" issued by the Vatican as a background re-
source for bishops concurs:
"Sexual orientation" does not constitute a quality comparable to race, ethnic
background, etc., in respect to non-discrimination. Unlike these, homosexual
orientation is an objective disorder ... and evokes moral concern.
Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Some Considerations Concerning the Re-
4ponse to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons, reprinted in 22
ORIGINS: CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE, Aug. 6, 1992, at 176.
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Moreover, it is not discrimination against an economically
impoverished class of citizens. As previously discussed, the available
data indicates that homosexual rights legislation is not necessary to
provide economic equality for homosexuals-as a class, homosex-
uals are economically advantaged, and are more likely to have a
professional or managerial career than are heterosexuals." 8
These laws seem to be the result more of interest group poli-
tics 99 than a conscious and deep commitment on the part of so-
ciety to embrace the homosexual lifestyle as an interest of the
highest order. However you view the state's interest in legislating
homosexual rights, it is far from compelling."'
What is more, typical homosexual rights laws also fail the
second part of the compelling interest test, because they are not
the least restrictive means of carrying out the state's interests in
protecting homosexuals. As previously discussed, these statutes
usually contain a number of exemptions for small businesses and
other classes of employers and landlords"' and the existence of
these secular exemptions "is substantial evidence that religious
exemptions would not threaten the statutory scheme."0 2 Recogni-
tion of a free exercise exemption would not destroy the state's
asserted interest in providing housing and employment opportuni-
ties to homosexuals-religious observers would be treated the
same as other classes entitled to exemptions, but the laws could
still be enforced widely to achieve most, if not all, of the intended
legislative benefits.20 3 Once a free exercise claim satisfies the re-
198 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
199 For a self-described "manifesto" setting forth in detail the strategy for this political
and media campaign, see KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 73. See also Altman, supra note 19,
at 125 ("the contemporary gay movement is following the style of traditional American
pressure-group politics, working through sympathetic politicians and party organizations").
200 In Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); review dismissed and cause remand-
ed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993), a California appellate court held that in the hierarchy of
state interests a law prohibiting housing discrimination against unmarried cohabitants was
not compelling. The court observed that the state housing commission had "failed to
explain what exactly is so invidious or unfairly offensive in not treating unmarried cohab-
iting couples as if they were married." Id. at 46. See also SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 23, at 160 (noting that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court has refused to
define homosexuality as a suspect classification," the state interest in protecting homosex-
uals against private discrimination is not a "sufficiently compelling justification" for re-
stricting free exercise).
201 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
202 Laycock, supra note 99, at 50.
203 Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45 (free exercise exemption did not threaten goal of
prohibiting discrimination in housing against unmarried applicants because only a limited
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quirements of the Smith doctrine, the state should have a heavy
burden of proving that a free exercise exemption would frustrate
the legislation's goals. Mere assertions of necessity are inadequate
when laws threaten fundamental rights of religious conscience.2°4
IV. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
As this Article was about to go to press, the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 2 °5 was signed into law by
President Clinton. This law, which was supported by an amazing
bipartisan coalition of liberals, moderates, and conservatives, 206
recognizes that Smith "virtually eliminated" constitutional protec-
tion of religious freedom2 7 and seeks to restore that protection
by creating a statutory exemption for religiously-motivated behavior
burdened by governmental action. Specifically, RFRA provides that
"Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility .... ,"M There is only one exception to this otherwise ab-
solute rule forbidding governmental burdens on religious free-
dom-government may substantially burden religious exercise only
if it acts "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest"
number of housing units would qualify for the exemption and "the state's ... interest
in providing housing is otherwise served by a plethora of other housing legislation"). As
Prof. Rivera's research has shown, many labor unions and corporations have policies
already in place stating that sexual orientation is not a factor in employment. Rivera,
supra note 39, at 477-79.
204 In State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985), appeal dis-
missed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986), the Minnesota Supreme Court merely asserted that a free
exercise exemption would frustrate the state's goal of eliminating discrimination. This
case hardly seems to live up to the notion of "most rigorous" scrutiny required for free
exercise claims under Hialeah. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
205 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4).
206 For example, in the United States Senate, which approved the bill by a vote of
97-3, its sponsors included liberal Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and conservative Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch. Moreover, groups supporting the bill included the National Association of
Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches, the Traditional Values Coalition, and the
American Civil Liberties Union. This remarkable alliance led President Clinton to remark
that the "power of God is such that even in the legislative process miracles can happen."
Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at
A18.
207 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2(a)(4).
208 Id at § 3(a). The reference to governmental action "substantially" burdening
religious exercise was added to clarify that RFRA was intended to codify "prior caselaw,
which does not protect persons against State actions which have only an incidental'bur-
den on their religious exercise." 139 CONG. REC. H8714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (state-
ment of Rep. Brooks).
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and by "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."2" In effect, RFRA creates, as a matter of
national civil rights policy, a statutory exemption for free exercise
equal in scope to the pre-Smith constitutional rule.21°
As applied to typical homosexual rights laws, RFRA provides
that-even if these laws are neutral and generally applicable-they
may not be enforced against religiously-motivated discrimination
unless the government is able to demonstrate that the legislation
is the least restrictive means of furthering a governmental interest
of the highest order. As previously discussed, this test is a very
rigorous one and should be difficult, if not impossible, for the
state to pass in the context of homosexual rights in employment
and housing.21
1
V. A NARRATivE AND A CONCLUSION
A. Narrative: How I Learned Who Wants to Stop The Church
Shortly after Smith was decided, a colleague observed that the
church could now be regulated to the same extent as General Mo-
tors.212 Although the analogy seemed apt, the threat appeared re-
mote. Surely, I thought, Ralph Nader doesn't wish to require air
bags to be installed in church pews. "Who," I asked myself, "has a
regulatory agenda that includes the church? Who wants to stop
the church?"
A few months later, the answer came to me when I was asked
to participate in a panel discussion on government-subsidized art
and censorship. The panel discussion was to take place at the
University film theater, and I prepared my remarks for what I
thought would be a typical University crowd-English professors
wearing tweed jackets and sandals (with socks!) armed with quota-
tions from Milton's Areopagitica. But as I walked into the screening
room at the theater, I sensed the room was filled with hate and
anger, not intellectual fervor.
One of the films being screened for our presentation was
Robert Hilferty's STOP THE CHURCH, a self-described "documenta-
ry" about what can only be described as a hate crime-the illegal
disruption of Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral by a group of homo-
209 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 3(b).
210 See id at § 2(a)(5).
211 See supra notes 172-204 and accompanying text.
212 See Laycock, supra note 113, at 1009.
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sexual and abortion activists. I had come prepared to witness what
I thought would be offensive films, but I was totally unprepared
for the hatred and blasphemy that flickered on the big screen.
Let me share with you just a few examples of this film's
Christophobia. When asked to describe the Catholic Church,
one woman responds: "The Catholic Church is hypocrisy and
hate." When asked the same question, a man says: "The Catholic
Church is arrogant, sterile, retrograde, blind." Another man is
even more forthcoming: "The Catholic Church is a tiny, anachro-
nistic, feudalist leftover which practices ritual sacrifice on the bod-
ies of gay men, lesbians, women, and people of color."
The scene shifts to inside St. Patrick's Cathedral where the
filmaker ridicules worshippers with a tune called The Vatican Rag.
First you get down on your knees
Fiddle with your rosaries
Bow your head with great respect
And genuflect, genuflect, genuflect.
Another scene change and we are privileged to witness the activists
at a pep rally warming up for their demonstration. A sign de-
clares, "Curb Your Dogma." A man shouts: "The Church is our
enemy." A woman tells the crowd that "freedom of religion is
bullshit, man." And so they seem to think it is. The film concludes
with coverage of the illegal disruption of Mass at St.
Patrick's-shrill whistles blowing, demonstrators screaming insults,
many people blocking aisles and the Communion rail in a mock
"die-in."
The audience here at the University was enthralled. They
particularly loved the scene in which Catholic worshippers were
ridiculed by the filmaker's clever use of The Vatican Rag. I was
ashamed of my University that evening for sponsoring this "docu-
mentary," but I was even more ashamed for those in the audience
who so thoroughly enjoyed this angry, hateful, Christophobic film.
213 I use this term, which refers to the fear and loathing of Christians (particularly
orthodox Christians who have the courage to take a public stand in defense of Biblical
morality), advisedly and literally. STOP THE CHURCH is pure hate. For a compelling ac-
count of a pastor of a small church in San Francisco who became the target of
Christophobic violence and hatred when he fired his church's organist after discovering
he was a practicing homosexual, see CHUCK MCILHENNY Er AL, WHEN THE WICKED SEIZE
A Crry (1993). Pastor McIlhenny's successful battle for religious freedom is reported in
Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1980).
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In the car on the way home I realized that I had just learned
who has a regulatory agenda aimed at stopping the Church, one
designed to "curb" those who believe in the orthodox teachings of
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other religious traditions about
sin and about sexuality. It was at that moment (or soon after) that
I decided to write this Article about the tension between religious
freedom and gay rights.
Religious freedom may be "bullshit" to some, but I believe it
is the cornerstone of our scheme of government. Charles Kingsley
speaks of two kinds of freedom, "the false where one is free to do
what he likes, and the true where he is free to do what he
ought."214 Gay rights legislation shackles true freedom in the
chains of false freedom. At least, that's what I learned at the mov-
ies.
B. Conclusion
As Douglas Laycock has noted, unless the Court gives full
scope to the exceptions to the general rule of Smith, that general
rule of no free exercise protection for religiously motivated con-
duct will create a "legal framework for persecution." 1 5 Just as
our federal government once "was quite willing to destroy Mor-
monism entirely if that were necessary to suppress polygamy,"216
it is not inconceivable that government may be willing to destroy
orthodox Christianity, Judaism, and Islam if necessary to protect
homosexuals from discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations. The scenario could go something like
this. First, prosecute individual believers like Margaret McCabe and
Mike Strong for discriminating against homosexuals in housing
and employment.2 17  Next, prosecute Christian schools218  and
214 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 308 (John P. Bradley et al.
eds., 1978).
215 Laycock, supra note 99, at 59.
216 Id. at 62. "The government prosecuted . . . Mormons for polygamy, it imposed
test oaths that denied Mormons the right to vote, and it dissolved the Mormon Church
and confiscated its property. The Supreme Court upheld all of this." Id (footnotes omit-
ted). See generally EDWIN B. FIRMAGE & R. COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900
(1988); LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY
OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS (1979). As Professor Laycock documents, religious persecution
"can happen, is happening, in the United States, even in 1991." Laycock, supra note 99,
at 67. "[U]nfamiliar, high-demand, proselytizing religions" are particularly vulnerable to
present-day inquisitions. Id. at 64.
217 Cf Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App.
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even churches"9 that discriminate against homosexuals. Then,
withdraw tax exempt status from religious schools that forbid ho-
mosexual dating or even from churches that refuse to ordain
homosexual pastors."'
Religions that make peace with the spirit of the age have little
to fear from the rulers of the day. But believers who refuse to
adapt their religious practices to the Zeitgeist are vulnerable under
Smith, unless the Court decides to protect religious pluralism by
giving full scope to Smith's exceptions.221
I have tried to show that homosexual rights legislation impos-
es heavy costs on the right of employers and landlords to take
character into account when making business decisions. These
costs are particularly heavy when borne by religiously-motivated
persons, who are declared outlaws merely for trying to obey God
in the conduct of their businesses. As Professor Laurence Tribe
once stated in a different context, "the power to reinforce one
type of relationship must not extend to an authority to stamp out
another."
222
2d Dist. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); review dismissed and cause remand-
ed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Desilets, No. 90-178 (Su-
per. Ct. Mass. Dec. 21, 1992).
218 See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
219 See Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1980).
220 Cf Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). If religiously-moti-
vated individuals are persecuted merely for trying to live out their faith, there is no good
reason to believe that the institutional church will be safe in the sanctuary when it en-
gages in the same acts of obedience to God. Perhaps the true meaning of Smith's con-
cept of religious neutrality is "[w]e must indeed all hang together, or most assuredly we
shall all hang separately." The quoted language, of course, is Benjamin Franklin's famous
statement at the signing of the Declaration of Independence. JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE
MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 112 (1984).
221 RFRA is not sufficient to protect religious freedom from this risk, because as an
act of Congress RFRA can be repealed at any time. Moreover, if Congress enacts homo-
sexual rights legislation, it can avoid a conflict with RFRA simply by providing an explicit
override. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107
Stat. 1488 (1993) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4).
222 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989 (1978). Gay rights laws
thus legislate one view of sexual morality-that of sexual relativism-and then enforce
this code of morality in society to stigmatize orthiodox religious believers as homophobes
whose religious exercise is nothing more than irrational bigotry (and thus deserving of
discouragement). As Professor Karst has observed in another context, it is illegitimate for
a political majority "to use the power of government to express its moral values by stig-
matizing another group." Karst, supra note 39, at 729. Through homosexual rights laws,
the state chooses sides in the cultural war that has divided our society, and one
side-orthodox religion-"is on the receiving end of the law's stigma and consequential
material harms." Id.
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Homosexuals are not similarly situated to racial and ethnic
minorities and other groups protected by antidiscrimination laws,
both because homosexuality remains a matter of moral controversy
and because homosexuals have not been economically impover-
ished by pervasive and invidious discrimination. Therefore, the
effect of homosexual rights legislation is primarily symbolic-the
values of the sexual revolution are codified and legitimized (and
inconsistent world views are correspondingly marginalized). I be-
lieve the costs of homosexual rights laws are too high, and I see
no benefit even remotely worth the cost. These laws should not be
passed and, where passed already, they should be repealed.
I have also tried to show that even under Smith (as properly
understood) most homosexual. rights laws are unconstitutional
when enforced against employers and landlords wlho make distinc-
tions on the basis of religious beliefs concerning sexual morality.
Typical homosexual rights laws are neither neutral nor generally
applicable. And, at least on occasion, these laws burden Smith-hy-
brid rights. Therefore, they must undergo the most rigorous of
scrutiny when challenged by religiously-motivated actors. These
laws cannot pass strict scrutiny, because they are not necessary
means of achieving compelling governmental ends.22
If I am wrong and the Court allows homosexual rights laws to
be enforced against religiously-motivated actors, it could be the
beginning of the end for religious pluralism in America.224 Reli-
223 Shelley Wessels and Bruce Bagni argue for a more crabbed role for free exercise
when it collides with restrictive anti-discrimination laws. They basically adopt a "prayer
closet" approach to religious freedom which denies protection to believers when they
"turn outward toward the world," to quote Wessels. Under this approach, which is incon-
sistent with the text, history, and caselaw of the Free Exercise Clause, religious freedom
would receive little or no protection when believers have the audacity to venture out into
what Professor Bagni refers to as "the secular world." Shelly K. Wessels, The Collision of
Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1223
(1989); Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Dis-
crimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 1514, 1539 (1979).
224 A recent event in San Francisco provides further evidence that gay rights and
religious pluralism are incompatible values. A committee of the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors voted unanimously to urge mayor Frank Jordon to remove an African-Ameri-
can Baptist minister from his seat on the city's Human Rights Commission. It seems the
minister, Rev. Eugene Lumpkin, had enraged gays and lesbians when he stated in a
newspaper interview that homosexuality is a sin and "an abomination against God." Ap-
parently this interpretation of the Bible disqualifies a person from holding public office
in San Francisco. See Dan Levy, New Push to Oust S.F. Rights Panelist, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug.
5, 1993, at A15. Interestingly, one of the Rev. Lumpkin's inquisitors, supervisor Terence
Hallinan, claimed, in remarkable Orwellian fashion, to be protecting San Francisco's "live-
and-let-live reputation." Id.
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gions that are willing to follow the advice of MTV and "free their
minds" by accepting homosexuality, bisexuality, and cohabitation
as lifestyles that are pleasing to God will find favor with Caesar.
However, those religions that stubbornly cling to old fashioned be-
liefs about sexual morality and marriage between husband and
wife will thrive once again in the catacombs.
